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LEGAL THEORY AND THE PIVOTAL ROLE
OF THE CONCEPT OF COERCION
DALE A. NANCE*

This paper addresses an important problem in modern legal philosophy: the problem of identifying the proper role of the concept of
coercion in a general theory of the nature of law. The present state of
philosophical art on this topic is the legacy of difficulties arising from a
naive positivism - generally thought to have over-emphasized the
role of coercive power. The resulting reaction in modern jurisprudence against the focus upon coercion reflects a failure to come to
grips fully with the underlying methodological issues of descriptive
legal theory.
Basically, such descriptive theory seeks, or ought to seek, a critically informed understanding of law "as it is".** This pursuit requires
that we make at least some effort to delineate the nature of this kind of
understanding. Most importantly, one must seek to appreciate the relevance of our normative deliberations concerning the use of coercion
in informing our descriptive undertakings, in particular by helping to
structure the analysis of basic legal concepts. Yet much, if not most,
descriptive legal theory has ignored this relevance. 1 Especially in re• Assistant Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. B.A. 1974, Rice University; J.D.
1977, Stanford University; M.A. (Jurisprudence and Social Policy) 1982, University of California,
Berkeley.
•• The author has modified the conventions concerning punctuation in quotations in the interest
of accuracy. Where punctuation marks are placed within quotations, they appear in the quoted text.
I. In a review of H.L.A. Hart's recent work on Bentham, David Lyons observes:
Much of Bentham's work was concerned with the analysis of legal concepts. By this I
mean not the identification and interpretation of general principles that are embedded in
the law but the explanation in more fundamental terms of the very idea of law and of the
more specific ideas such as that of a legal right or obligation. Thus, Bentham was concerned to reveal not just what the law of a particular jurisdiction at a given time requires
and allows but also what it is for there to be law, what it is for someone to have a legal
right, and so on. A good deal of work within legal philosophy was focused on such abstract
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cent decades, such theory has become preoccupied with authority and
rules to the virtual, though sometimes hesitant, rejection of coercion
and coercive sanctions as phenomena of paramount theoretical concern. 2 Thus, for example, a respected modem theorist has come to
assert that the use of sanctions ultimately backed by force is "not a
feature which forms part of our concept of law." 3
Relatedly, if not consequently, such theory displays a subtle tendency toward a potentially authoritarian conservatism, the kind of
conservatism exemplified by Lord Devlin in his disposition to find the
law in popular morality. 4 I hope to exemplify this tendency in what
follows. For the present, suffice it to observe that it should not be
surprising if the modem emphasis upon the structure and elements of
morality and authoritative rules and deemphasis of the coercive aspect
of law contribute to the distortion of the issues facing a legal decisionmaker, assuming that he or she has been exposed, directly or indirectly, to the temper of modem legal philosophy. It seems to be a
common, if tacit, view that such decisions proceed along something
like the following moral program. First, one decides whether the extant state of affairs is optimal (or moral, or just). If not, something
must be done. That something, of course, is to enact a law. Once one
decides to do that, coercive sanctions must naturally be imposed to
ensure the compliance of recalcitrants. 5 This program is flawed in a
questions. But the connections between this seemingly pure theoretical inquiry and the
moral concerns or commitments of legal philosophers have not been systematically
explored.
Lyons, Founders and Foundations of Legal Positivism (Book Review), 82 MICH. L. REV. 722, 727
(1984).
2. The general trend of modem theory is summarized well by Jerome Hall:
There is disagreement as to whether the sanction is an essential part of law, and among
those who hold that the sanction is essential, there is disag~eement not only regarding its
properties but also whether the sanction of positive law is unique. The puzzlement is increased by the fact that natural law philosophers like Aquinas and Kant agree with legal
positivists like Austin and Kelsen that the sanction is an essential part of law. And adding
to that puzzle is the recent agreement by distinguished representatives of those opposed
philosophies, that the sanction is not an essential part of positive law [citing Fuller and
Hart], although they also agree that there must be sanctions somewhere in the legal system.

J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 101 (1973).
3. J. RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 159 (1975). Elsewhere, however, Raz asserts, "The
three most general and important features of the law are that it is normative, institutionalized, and
coercive . . . . Naturally, every theory of a legal system must be compatible with an explanation of
these features." J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (2d ed. 1980).
4. SeeP. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). The tendency remains notwithstanding criticism of legal moralism by such prominent figures of modem jurisprudence as H. L.A. Hart. See
H. L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963). See also Bark, Tradition and !Yfora/ity in Constitutional Law (AM. ENTERPRISE INST.) (1984).
5. I call this the "It ain't right - there oughta be a law!" approach, although this is somewhat
misleading in highlighting the populist version of the program. Certainly among jurists other versions
are more common. Whatever the details of their programs, however, it is significant that "[m]odem
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number of respects, most importantly in that it rests upon an unreasonable assumption that the propriety of a prohibition, injunction, or
other legal action can be determined without serious regard to the
sanction which is associated with the action in question. A better
statement of the program which should be followed runs something
like this: having identified suboptimality in the extant state of affairs,
one must decide whether it is proper - morally permissible and
pragmatically prudent - to use coercive force in aid of various designs to change things, given the character or kind of suboptimality
involved and given the probability of improving matters by the attempt. In particular, the decision-maker cannot then ignore or slide
over the fact that the decision being made is a decision about the employment or potential employment of coercive power, with all the
careful reluctance that this should entail. 6
It is in response to these problems that the following comments
are directed. However, I will not here attempt to detail the flaws of
the program of decision-making just criticized or to defend in detail
the pragmatistic one suggested as a substitute. 7 Nor will I attempt to
prove that any particular theory of law leads, inevitably or probably, to
legal philosophers who exclude the sanction from their concept of law are apt to concede that the use of
force is sometimes necessary, but that is minimized as a merely practical matter or as otherwise insignificant." J. HALL, supra note 2, at 115.
6. The pragmatism involved is quite familiar to lawyers in the form of the right/remedy distinction. it is a common observation that one cannot make much headway in the analysis of the legal right>
of the parties to a lawsuit without attending to the remedy or remedies sought. This point- sometimes not initially obvious to students - is reflected in virtually every modern textbook for first-year
law courses by the early introduction of materials, in greater or lesser depth, concerning remedies and
(particularly in the non-criminal context) their origins in the common law writs. Compare, e.g., J.
0UKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 5-8 {1981) with C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER, & P. MARTIN, PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 60-66, 71-76, 90-96 (2d ed.
1983). As further examples, see J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER, & J. SEXTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 17-19, Ch. 4 (4th ed. 1985); W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS 1-3 (7th ed. 1982);
L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW {3d ed. 1972; compare 4th ed. 1981). Of course,
a sophisticated approach can distinguish, and might successfully separate, the decision as to whether a
coercive remedy of some type is appropriate (i.e., the legal "right" issue) from the decision as to which
coercive remedy is called for (i.e., the legal "remedy" issue). See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS§ I {5th ed. 1984); cf D. DoBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 1.2 (1973).
In any event, the indicated focus upon the "remedy" issue highlights the ultimately coercive aspect of
the "right" issue; this is so despite the fact that the remedy is not necessarily itself a coercive act, but
may only be the declaration of a (remedial) duty which is backed by (the threat of) coercive acts in the
event of noncompliance. To avoid misunderstanding, it should be clarified that I do not claim that
every identifiable rule which is commonly called a "law" is backed by a coercive sanction, but only that
what is crucially important about the rules not so backed is their relationship to other rules which are.
As an example, consider the "laws" that determine how a legislative bill itself becomes law. Cf J.
HALL, supra note 2, Ch. V.
7. A useful beginning point would be Lawrence Becker's "root idea of a right":
The existence of a right is the existence of a state of affairs in which one person (the rightholder) has a claim on an act or forbearance from another person (the duty-bearer) in the
sense that, should the claim be exercised or in force, and the act or forbearance not be done,
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the flawed program. These matters I leave largely to the reader's reasonable inference, though some suggestive comments will be made.
They are mentioned primarily to motivate the discussion of the methodological problem first described. Even in that regard, I will not
claim to present a complete solution to the problems presented. My
efforts will be limited to outlining basic ideas which may help to defuse
some long-standing jurisprudential controversies and provide a framework within which better solutions may be constructed. In part I, I
begin the development of the significance of normative deliberations
for the methodology of legal theory by identifying a crucial preliminary issue. That issue is the threshold question of the proper scope of
legal inquiry, itself one aspect of the most general and persistent question in descriptive legal theory, namely "What is law?" It will be argued that coercion is a crucial element in the specification of such
scope of inquiry. In part II, a critical analysis of traditional positivist
and natural law theories will be used to clarify and further develop the
proposed approach. Finally, in part III, the results of the analysis will
be recapitulated with a discussion of some reservations and potential
objections.
I. NORMATIVE DELIBERATIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL
THEORY

In attempting to answer the important question "What is law?", a
crucial observation, though occasionally made, has yet to be sufficiently developed. 8 The point may be reviewed by considering the following, comparatively innocuous question: Why is the term 'house'
not usually defined (or used) to include the first twenty feet of ground
below the erected structure? Or, for that matter, a piece of the moon?
One might respond: "Well it certainly could have been, but it just
wasn't. Why ask the question? The choice, whether explicitly or implicitly made, was arbitrary, one made simply for the sake of having
some basis for mutual understanding." Indeed, the choice does not
seem to be logically necessitated. Nevertheless, the response surely
misses the point, because the choice was not arbitrary, if by that one
means that there is no reason (other than simply having some convention) not to include twenty feet of soil in the term 'house'. The crucial
it would be justifiable, other things being equal, to use coercive measures to extract either
the performance required or compensation in lieu of that performance.

L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 8 (1977). See a/so Becker, Three Types
ofRights, 13 GA. L. REV. 1197(1979).
8. That the question posed is an important question can be established by arguments not fundamentally inconsistent with the approach developed here. See, e.g., J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 7-13 (1984).
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realization is that 'house' does not include the twenty feet below because such a concept or convention would not (ordinarily) be a useful
one; in any event, it would not (ordinarily) be the most useful one. 9 In
fact, most (if not all) meanings, including stipulative definitions, reflect
the purposes and values which are common to some group of communicating humans. Such shared purpose is what gives the communication its value. 10
Where the complexity or multiplicity of purposes which are reflected in a language, or part thereof, is great, the inherent ambiguity
of the important words is also great. 11 This is the case with the concept of 'law' or that of 'legal system', as compared with 'house', for
example. As a consequence, if one attempts to unravel, explicate, or
define concepts of great corresponding complexity and multiplicity of
empirical purpose, there will be a significant need for clarification of
purpose. Any choice among various alternative purposes is itself subject to evaluation and criticism. If, therefore, one asks "What is law?"
or "What is a legal system?", he might legitimately be answered at first
with another question, such as: "What is the purpose of your in··
quiry?" Or, derivatively: "What are the criteria of success of your
investigation?" 12
Professor Hart is one who has recognized, though incompletely
accommodated, these observations. He says of the analytical or definitional problems of jurisprudence:
. . . [t]oo little has been said about the criteria for judging the
adequacy of a definition of law. Should such a definition state
what, if anything, the plain man intends to convey when he uses
the expressions "law" or "legal system"? Or should it rather aim
to provide, by marking off certain social phenomena from others, a
9. Of course, especially outside of everyday discourse, there could be circumstances in which such
a concept would be useful. For a discussion of the ramifications of the differences in the interpretation
of law between "lay" terminology and "technical" terminology, see B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).

10. For example, it can be shown that the "units" for measurement of temporal and spatial intervals are "arbitrary" in the sense of not being necessitated by either purely logical considerations or
empirical facts. Nevertheless, the units chosen, as well as the stipulative definitions of congruence at a
distance and uniformity of time, are. subject to criticism on the basis of the implications for the formulation of physical laws. Descriptive simplicity is the critical consideration here. See H. REICHENBACH,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPACE AND TIME§§ 4-6, 17 (1958). More generally, seeR. ROBINSON, DEFINITION (1950).
11. See H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REV. 37 (1954).

Three Types
ts not funda.EMAN, THE

12. The legal philosopher with probably the earliest and keenest appreciation of these observations was Hermann Kantorowicz, who summarized their import in the phrase "conceptual pragmatism". See H. KANTOROWICZ, THE DEFINITION OF LAW (1958). Unfortunately, his narrow purpose
of developing the conceptual basis of a history of juristic thought led him to a slightly narrower conception of law than that developed here.
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classification useful or illuminating for theoretical purposes? 13

Implicitly, one purpose of an objective investigator might be to catalogue the purposes of "plain men" and how each is reflected in the
linguistic "carving" of reality. 14 Moreover, there is no obvious reason
to limit oneself to the purposes of plain men. A "science" of law, so
conceived, should also include in the catalogue the purposes and consequent conceptions of non-plain men- intellectuals, politicians, lawyers, criminals(!), and so on. Each has a perspective to contribute. 15
The nature of theoretical deliberations would be clearer if this were
kept in mind: one of the catalogued definitions, or yet some other,
might be best for illuminating such deliberations. 16
If we heed· Hart's correct suggestion, we may ask what definitional lines should be drawn, as a "rational reconstruction" of ordinary usage, 17 so as to mark off 'legal phenomena' for theoretical study.
And preliminarily, we may ask what criteria for making such a choice
should be employed. I suggest two. First, the field of investigation
should not be prematurely narrowed by the definitional borders of
legal phenomena. In other words, a relatively "weak" definition or
liberally inclusive scope of inquiry should be employed, within which
more discriminating theories can be developed. Second, the primacy
of practical deliberations should inform our theorizing. It is my thesis
that these two criteria best reflect the purposes of a rational inquiry
into the nature of law. The first reflects the purposes of neutrality and
13. H. L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 2-3. Elsewhere, Hart gives what he optimistically considers to
be the basic conception of an "educated man", but he does not investigate the purposes which underlie
such a conception, and he specifically rejects it as an adequate account for his (presumably theoretical)
purposes. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 2-5 (1961).
14. [O]ur common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations:
these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long
test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably
practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon - the most favored alternative method.
J. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 130 (1961).
15. A similar point is made by John Finnis in beginning his perceptive analysis of the problems of
descriptive legal theory. J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 1-2 (1980).
16. Certainly ordinary language has no claim to be the last word, if there is such a thing. It
embodies, indeed, something better than the metaphysics of the Stone Age, namely, . . . , the
inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men. But then, that acumen has
been concentrated primarily upon the practical business of life. If a distinction works well for
practical purposes in ordinary life (no mean feat, for even ordinary life is full of hard cases),
then there is sure to be something in it, it will not mark nothing: yet this is likely enough to be
not the best way of arranging things if our interests are more extensive or intellectual than the
ordinary.
J. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 133.
17. On "rational reconstruction" oflegal terminology, see J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, supra note
8, at 2-4.
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objectivity, a desire not to prejudge the normative and empirical connections to be developed, as well as a modesty, born of experience,
with regard to our ability to cut to the heart of the matter by a simple
definitional exercise. 18 The second reflects the belief that normative
concerns cannot be ignored even in the building of a descriptive theory
oflaw. "A general theory of law must be normative as well as conceptual."19 The two dimensions must inform one another; neither can be
profitably pursued in isolation. In fact, they are different components
of the same general enterprise. 20 As Lon Fuller opined in the early
fifties (and thereafter):
In attempting to outline briefly what seem to me to be the needs of
legal philosophy in this country, I start with a pragmatic conception of the function of philosophy. As I see it, the object of legal
philosophy is to give an effective and meaningful direction to the
work of lawyers, judges, legislators, and law teachers. If it leaves
the activities of these men untouched, if it has no implications for
the question of what they do with their working days, then legal
philosophy is a failure. 21
18. A similar point is emphasized by Professors Nonet and Selznick in distinguishing between
"'weak definitions" and the "strong theories" which are to be built thereon. See P. NoNET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 8-18 (1978). Cf H.
KANTOROWICZ, supra note 12, at II; Introduction, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 16-19 (K.
Winston ed. 1981 ). The basic idea is traced by Mortimer and Sanford Kadish to:
. . . a simple precept of what Charles Sanders Peirce called the logical conscience. In order
to avoid blocking the way of inquiry, this precept warns us not to employ restrictive definitions that exclude real possibilities from consideration. Theories about the nature of legal
systems, from which are derived all sorts of propositions about the entitlements of defendants, the obligations of officials, and the nature of proper judicial reasoning, run the same
risk as theories about the nature of art - namely, that substantive choices of particular
programs in the domain will be defended on the basis of a prescribed concept of the domain. In such a case the need for a defense has been obviated. The commitments justifying
one's substantive choices have been implanted in the theory and then read out from the
theory as discoveries.

M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 217-18 {1973). Cf Honore, Groups, Laws, and
Obedience, in OxFORD EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (2d series) 1-2 {A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973).
19. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY vii (1978). The implicit identification made in the
text of "'practical" and "'normative" indicates the use herein of the term "'practical" in the broadly
normative sense of "with a view to decision and action" rather than the more narrowly instrumental
sense of "'workable" or "'efficient". This follows J. FINNIS, supra note 15, at 12. See generally J. R.Az,
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS {1975).
20. Early modern recognition of the interdependence of the social scientist's normative concerns
and his descriptive theory, even (or at least) in the very selection of concepts to be employed, is to be
found in the works of Weber. See MAX WEBER ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 24,
58, 76-82 (E. Shils & H. Finch ed. 1949); M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(!949) .
2!. L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 249-50 {K. Winston ed. !981 ). As will be
evident in what follows, Fuller's point is somewhat too narrow in focusing only upon the practical
issues facing members of the "'legal" profession. Cf D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 7
(!977): "'The ultimate concern of the philosophy of law . . . is to guide us in making normative decisions regarding laws and our relation, as individuals, to laws."
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A derivative thesis is the following: Questions about what ought
to be undertaken with the aid of coercion, or required subject to coercive sanctions, and how individuals ought to respond to such undertakings and requirements by others are critical, indeed the most
important, practical concerns which underlie our study of law and
which ought, therefore, to inform our theorizing, including our definitional (scope of inquiry) formulations. As Ronald.Dworkin has put it:
Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away
from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under
coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such
. persons as having broken the law or having failed to meet their
legal obligations, or having interfered with other people's legal
rights. Even in clear cases (a bank robber or a willful breach of
contract), when we are confident that someone had a legal obligation and broke it, we are not able to give a satisfactory account of
what that means, or why that entitles the state to punish or coerce

him? 2
Consequently, in order to bring legal theory to focus upon the crucial
practical issues concerning law, I suggest a modification of the prevailing theories to include within the scope of inquiry all coercive human
interactions, by which I mean, roughly, interactions in which either
coercion is intentionally and directly employed by a person against
another or there is a reasonable fear of such employment.
Before beginning to address the more serious difficulties which
may be thought to occasion this suggestion, it may be helpful to make
a brief comment on the present use of the term 'coercion'.
Paradigmatically, by 'coercion' I refer to the direct use of physical
force or the threat of such force to..obtain compliance with rules, commands, directives, etc. It is not necessary for the purposes of this paper to examine in detail the nature and kinds of coercion or the
relationship of the concept(s) of coercion to that of 'sanction'. 23 It is
22. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 19, at 15. Professor Hart makes the point more precisely, if less
graphically:
[W]e are committed at least to the general critical principle that the use of legal coercion by
any society calls for justification as something prima facie objectionable to be tolerated only
for the sake of some countervailing good.
H.L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 20. See also J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 4-9, 20-22 (1973)
(discussing "The Presumptive Case for Liberty"); cf Westen, Freedom and Coercion - Virtue Words
and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J.- (forthcoming).
23. See generally Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SciENCE AND METHOD: EssAYS IN HONOR
OF ERNEST NAGEL 440-72 (S. Morgenbesser, ed. 1969); COERCION, NOMOS XIV (J.R. Pennock &
J. W. Chapman, ed. 1972); J. HALL, supra note 2, Ch. V; Oberdiek, The Role of Sanctions and Coercion
in Understanding Law and Legal Systems, 21 AM. J. JURIS. 71 (1976). Obviously, these citations are
not intended to express agreement with everything to be found in these works. Indeed, the implications
of the arguments presented here may include substantial revisions of the insights therein adduced.
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sufficient merely to indicate the centrality of such examinations in an
adequate jurisprudence. The most obvious distinctions which could be
elaborated are (i) that between physical and non-physical coercion24
and (ii) that between using coercion directly, e.g., overt or disguised
threats, and indirectly, by which I have in mind the implicit "threats"
which attend even the most cooperative kinds of interactions by virtue
of the existence of a background set of coercively backed rules. Thus,
for example, the simple sale of a nonessential consumer good may
have involved the parties' reliance upon the coercively backed rules
concerning theft, concerning an owner's power to alienate property,
and perhaps more. Though these rules and their enforcement certainly are legal phenomena, the transaction itself is not - though, of
course, it will have legal consequences by virtue of the change of ownership. Thus, even the sale of a "necessity" by a "monopolist", where
some may wish to assert the employment of coercion, is not coercion
in the direct sense, although there may have been or may be coercion
in the creation and maintenance of the monopoly. 25 Of course, there
will be many hard cases. As others have said, it need not be our intention to provide a "litmus test" for legal phenomena, but rather to push
the fuzzy cases away from some central areas of proper concern. 26
24. Much attention is paid to this distinction in the discussions cited in the previous note,
although many of these discussions suffer from too great an attachment to (supposedly) ordinary language usage. The special significance of physical coercion and the realistic threat thereof contained
within most legal sanctions is manifested, to a greater or lesser extent, in a wide variety of legal doctrines. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (holding not justiciable a declaratory judgment
action by a doctor and several patients challenging constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting use of
contraceptives). In reply to the fact of the doctor's sworn testimony that as a law-abiding citizen he
was deterred by the statute, the court's opinion reads:
We cannot agree that if Dr. Buxton's compliance with these statutes is uncoerced by the
risk of their enforcement, his patients are entitled to a declaratory judgment concerning the
statutes' validity. And, with due regard to Dr. Buxton's standing as a physician and to his
personal sensitiveness, we cannot accept, as the basis of constitutional adjudication, other
than as chimerical the fear of enforcement of provisions that have during so many years
gone uniformly and without exception unenforced.
!d. at 508 (plurality opinion by Frankfurter, J.). Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(subsequent criminal action brought against same doctor; criminal prohibition held unconstitutional).
The general problem of non-enforcement instantiated by the cited cases is discussed in Bonfield, The
Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Non-enforcement, 49 IOWA L. REv. 389 (1964).
25. Similar issues have been encountered by the courts in determining whether "state action" has
occurred for purposes of the application of constitutional protections of certain individual rights. See
generally Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (reviewing various theories and refusing to
find requisite state action in private sale by warehouseman, pursuant to§ 7-210 of New York Uniform
Commercial Code, to enforce lien on goods stored). Of course, the analogy is not intended to suggest
that a social phenomenon qualifying as law under the coercion test ought to be considered state action
for the purposes of constitutional analysis. A more sophisticated interrelationship would have to be
developed here.
26. Cf H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 16-17 (1961). The point may be expressed by saying that
we wish to delineate a fuzzy set (law or legal system) within the domain of social phenomena in such a
manner as to assure that phenomena of closely related moral concerns peculiar to the law are given a

10

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

Putting this matter of the meaning of coercion aside, let us turn to
issues of more frequent jurisprudential controversy.

II.

COMPARISONS TO OTHER APPROACHES

The classically positivist sound of my proposal, reemphasizing as
it does the coercive element of law, may strike those who are well
versed in modern legal philosophy as entailing a rejection of the great
strides forward since Austin and Kelsen (the preeminent classical positivists), strides attributable to the efforts of legal theorists such as
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller. This would be an erroneous impression,
principally because my proposed inclusion of coercive interaction is
not exclusive of other social phenomena. In order to make plain the
nature of these connections, to elucidate and substantiate the theses
put forward in the previous section and to demonstrate their relevance
to the controversies of modern legal philosophy, it will be useful to
survey briefly some relevant features of the two principal schools of
thought in Occidental jurisprudence, legal positivism and natural law.
In view of the character of the present proposal, we will take as a focus
the extent and rationale of the attempts by preeminent scholars within
these traditions to rule "out-of-bounds" the simple coercive interaction of the robber with his victim. 27 Although no comprehensive critique of these scholars is intended, we will be looking to their
theoretical purposes, broadly conceived, and suggesting the strengths
and weaknesses in the success criteria which have been adopted, explicitly or implicitly, for specifying the scope of theoretical inquiry
into law.

A. The Positivist Tradition
The prominent legal positivist writers give us only clues as to
their positions on the methodological questions raised here. One thing
is clear enough: the touchstone of positivism is the distinction between
description and prescription, in large part a rejection of classical teleological metaphysics. 28 In the context of jurisprudence, this is manifested as an insistence upon a distinction between "analytical
jurisprudence" and "normative jurisprudence", the former being conhigh grade of membership in the fuzzy set. See D. DUBOIS & H. PRADE, Fuzzy SETS AND SYSTEMS:
(1980).
27. In one weak sense, none of the authors to be discussed fails to include the robber within the
scope of inquiry: namely, each in fact discusses the interaction of the robber and victim. But the
discussion is rather consistently devoted to a linguistically "analytical" or definitional exclusion based
upon inadequately explained grounds, as the following text will demonstrate.
28. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 180 et seq. (1961). See also J. FINNIS, supra note 15, Ch.
II.
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
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cerned with the analysis of the concepts and structures of "law as it
is", the latter being concerned with evaluative criticism of law. 29 Unfortunately, there has been a temptation to overstate the distinction
and thus to ignore the relationships developed in the preceding section, to believe that descriptive theory can and should be undertaken
without any analytical recourse to the theorist's normative concerns.
As prominent examples, we will briefly consider the work of John
Austin, Hans Kelsen, and H.L.A. Hart.
Austin

Austin's conception of law is a system ("society") in which there
exists a determinate group of persons, the sovereign, the general commands of which are habitually obeyed by others in the community and
which is not in the habit of obeying anyone else. 30 Although the coercive power of the sovereign's commands is an integral part of Austin's
theory, Austin might nevertheless reject the gunman's action as an instance of legal phenomena on at least three grounds. The first might
be that the notion of a "command" entails authority, something which
the gunman lacks. However, even though Austin does speak of "superiority" and "inferiority" as implicit in commands, he clarifies that the
relationship involved must be understood in terms of power, rather
than authority. 31 This manifests Austin's positivistic effort to define
law in wholly non-evaluative terms. Indeed, building the notion of
authority into the very definition of law would seem to prejudge or
require prejudgment of crucial normative or descriptive issues, e.g.,
whether and to what extent a particular social rule or system has authority. 32 This surely is inappropriate if our goal is to set out the scope
of an (open-minded) inquiry, as indeed the very title of Austin's work
29. See. e.g., J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, supra note 8, at I, 22. Aside from the separation of
analytical jurisprudence from normative jurisprudence, the identification of the essential features of
positivism is extremely problematic. Many philosophers regard the unifying theme of analytical positivism to be the insistence upon having a purely formal test for determining the legal validity of a given
rule, i.e. a test which is independent of the content of the rule. For example: "Whatever X says is the
law is the law." Thus, X is said to posit the law. As a reaction to classical natural law, there is also a
demand for a test which is independent of divine sanction (vt:Z., X # God) and of authority inherent in
other non-human sources (viz., X # Nature). See generally id. at 13-38.
30. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954) (first
published in 1832).
31. !d. at 24-25.

32. For such reasons, Hart reconstructs Austin's terminology by referring to "orders backed by
threats" rather than "commands". H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 19-20 (1961). On the controversial
character of legal authority, compare Ladenson, In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law, 9:2
PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 134 (1980) with Raz, Authority and Justification, 14:1 PHIL AND PUB. AFF. 3
(1985).
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indicates. 33
The second and third grounds are related: for the gunman situation to exemplify law, Austin would say, the gunman would have to be
coercively dominant ("sovereign") in the "society" and proceed, at
least in part, by the use of generalized orders, like "Pay over half your
earnings each month." These are not usually, or at least not invariably, the characteristics of gunmen. It is Austin's use of these characteristics which leads Hart to call Austin's conception the "gunman
situation writ large". 34 The reaction which I hope the reader will have
at this point is to ask: "How are these descriptive or definitional characteristics normatively relevant?" The positivist's answer would presumably be: "They aren't, at least not necessarily; but they are
relevant to a science of law." But what could this mean? If, as might
appear to be the case, Austin is simply engaging in a reproduction of
ordinary usage of the term 'law', then he is subject to the criticism,
discussed in the previous section of this paper, that such an historiographic approach requires theoretical justification. 35 If, on the other
hand, Austin's conception is intended as useful for theoretical purposes, we find ourselves at a loss as to what those purposes might be.
It cannot be the basic positivist purpose of removing value-laden concepts from a descriptive theory of law; nothing "value-laden" is removed by restricting attention from the general class of commands to
those involving large scale coercive dominance and generalized orders.
33. It may be worthwhile distinguishing my approval of Austin on this point from that of many
antagonists of the (supposedly) classical natural law approach. The latter would come about in something like the following way. It would be observed that the employment of an evaluative notion of
authority (or, a purely "pedigree" notion of authority - i.e., traceability to the sovereign - coupled
with an evaluative conception of sovereignty) would be subject to the same criticism as such natural law
theory: they each identify law with morally good (or authoritative) law and thereby violate our (ordinary language or) common sense of the meaningfulness of phrases like "morally bad (unauthoritative)
law." See, e.g., J. MURPHY & J. CoLEMAN, supra note 8, at 17-19. But this argument begs the question. Unless the proper purpose of legal theory is to reproduce our ordinary language usages, i.e. to
reproduce the meaningfulness of its phrases, the natural lawyer's limitation of law to authoritative
regimes cannot be rejected simply on the ground that it fails to consider iniquitous regimes (like that of
Nazi Germany) as involving law where (at least some peoples') ordinary language would so classify
them. (Compare the similar way in which Hart begs the question of the distinguishability of the gunman from law by focusing on our common sense of "obligation". I d. at 24-25. Moreover, one might
attempt to avoid this problem by clearly specifying a purely non-evaluative notion of authority. The
matter is complicated (see infra note 58), and this very fact argues strongly for the simple, non-evaluative specification of the scope of inquiry that Austin was trying to provide, leaving these difficult questions to be resolved at the level of theory construction.
34. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 7, Ch. II (1961); J. MURPHY & J. CoLEMAN, supra note
8, at 25-27, 31.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 11-16. In fact, Austin recognizes that his conceptualization does involve a modification of ordinary language. E.g., J. AUSTIN, supra note 30, at 19, 20-21.
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If anythi.ng, something value-laden is added. 36
It is important to observe that these critical questions are radically different in tenor from the now well-received criticisms of Austin's theory. H. L.A. Hart, for example, accepts the restrictions based
upon coercive dominance and generality as necessary to Austin's theory, and even adds further elements so as to better repmduce our common-sense notions about law, arguing that Austin's theory is not
"sufficient to account for two salient features of most legal systems:
the continuity of the authority to make law possessed by a succession
of different legislators, and the persistence of laws long after their
maker and those who rendered him obedience have perished." 37 Now,
the same objections which were raised above with regard to Austin
can clearly be made against Hart's reconstructive elaboration of Austin's theory. And we can point to the primary source of the difficulty:
Hart expects both too much and too little from a definition of law.
"Too much" in the sense that there is no reason to expect a definition
to provide us an "account" of all the features (even "salient" ones) of
"most" legal systems, certainly not without the addition of other concepts. "Too little" in the sense that a definition should not exclude
from consideration social phenomena which do not have, for example,
the continuity of many modern legal systems. 38

Kelsen
Kelsen proceeds in a fashion somewhat similar to Austin, but we
are able to identify something more concrete about his underlying purposes. In the first place, Kelsen rightly perceives that, despite the
"constitutive" aspect of even scientific cognition, 39 a descriptive science of law must attempt to avoid ideological bias. 4 ° Further, he appears to ·distinguish between setting the scope of inquiry and
developing a theory therein, for he writes: "[A] theory of law must
begin by defining its object matter. " 41 Kelsen then proceeds as
follows:
To arrive at a definition of law, it is convenient to start from the
usage of language, that is, to determine the meaning of the word
36. See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MORALITY Of LAW 46-49 {rev. ed. !969) {discussing the "generality•· of law as one of the elements of law's "internal morality").
37. H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, Chs. II-IV {196!).
38. See Gibbs, Definitions of LaiV and Empirical Questions, 2 LAW & Soc. REV. 429 (!968). It
can also be persuasively argued that Austin's theory is not so deficient in explaining the persistence and
continuity of modem legal systems as Hart claims. See Ladenson, supra note 32, at 145-57.
39. H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW§ 26 {!967) (first published in !934).
40. Id.
4!. Id. at 30.
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"law" as equivalent to the German word Recht, French droit, Italian diritto. Our task will be to examine whether the social phenomena described by these words have common characteristics by
which they may be distinguished from similar phenomena, and
whether these characteristics are significant enough to serve as elements for a concept of social-scientific cognition. 42

Thus, taking common language merely as a "convenient" starting
place, Kelsen arrives at two features of law which are characteristic
and significant: (1) these "objects" are systems of norms for human
behavior (i.e. "social orders"); and (2) they are coercive. 43 He specifically, and reasonably, rejects certain other characteristics as definitional on account of their variability. 44 This basic result will be seen to
be similar to that at which we will ultimately arrive in this paper. 45
However, from this relatively sound beginning, l{elsen goes off
the track by building into his conception of a coercive social order
something which is not entailed by either of the two specified dimensions. A requirement of effectiveness ("by and large") of the system
arises from (i) Kelsen's claim that one cannot have a "system" of
norms without a basic norm with reference to which the validity of the
other norms is determined and which itself is simply "presupposed", 46
together with (ii) his claim that an ineffective norm cannot be presupposed. Thus Kelsen distinguishes the robber gang from a legal system
in the following way:
Why is the coercive order that constitutes the community of the
robber gang and comprises the internal and external order not in42. I d. at 30-3 I.
43. Jd. §§ 6a-6b. Kelsen has been criticized for taking the "lowest common denominator" approach to defining law by looking simply to the one feature or set of features present in all ordinary
language applications. See, e.g., I. FINNIS, supra note 15, at 5-6, 9-10. Although Kelsen does not
explain his criteria of "significance", it is clear that something more is involved than this criticism
admits. Kelsen, despite his well-known ethical subjectivism, must contemplate "significance" in the
coercive aspect of law. That this is a normative significance is suggested by Kelsen's insistence that a
definition of law which does not "determine law as a coercive order, must be rejected . . . because
coercion is a factor of great importance for the cognition of social relationships . . . particularly, because by defining law as a coercive order, a connection is accounted for that exists in the case most
important for the cognition of the law, the law of the modern state: the connection between law and
state. The modern state is essentially a coercive order. . . . " H. KELSEN, supra note 39, at 54. This,
according to Kelsen, has at least the normative significance of undercutting "one of the most effective
ideologies of legitimacy" which seeks to "justify the state through the law". Jd. at 318-19. See generally id. Ch. VI.
44. The existence of a monopoly on the use of force is so rejected (H. KELSEN, supra note 39, at
35-37) as is the securing of peace often associated therewith (id. at 37-39).
45. See infra text accompanying note I 59. The principal differences will be seen to lie in my
claims that (a) the two features should be expressed in terms of concrete human action rather than as
an abstract system of rules, and (b) the two features should be listed in the disjunctive, specifying two
sufficient conditions for identifying legal phenomena.
46. H. KELSEN, supra note 39, § 34. See also id. at 31.
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terpreted as a legal order? Why is the subjective meaning of this
coercive order (that one ought to behave in conformity with it) not
interpreted as its objective meaning? Because no basic norm is presupposed according to which one ought to behave in conformity
with this order. But why is no such basic norm presupposed? Because this order does not have the lasting effectiveness without
which no basic norm is presupposed. The robber's coercive order
does not have this effectiveness, if the norms of the legal order in
whose territorial sphere of validity the gang operates are actually
applied to the robbers' activity as being illegal behavior; if the
members of the gang are deprived of their liberty or their lives by
coercive acts that are interpreted as imprisonment and death
sentences; and if thus the activity of the gang is terminated - in
short, if the coercive order regarded as the legal order is more effective than the coercive order constituting the gang. 47
It is not explained why a norm which is not "lastingly effective" is not
presupposed. This appears to be an empirical claim about the behavior of "norm presupposing". If so, it holds little promise for Kelsen,
who acknowledges that presupposition is person-specific; what is a
legal system is, to that extent, very much in the eyes of the beholder,
or rather the mind of the presupposer. 48 There is little warrant for a
claim that individuals cannot presuppose a norm simply because it is
not "lastingly effective". And any recourse to presupposition by a majority or by a powerful minority would raise comparably unsupportable claims of equally dubious relevancy. Such aU-or-nothing
conceptions are strange notions to build into a descriptive theory. 49 In
the end, one is left to ponder the peculiarity of Kelsen's claim, based
upon some notion of comparative effectiveness, that were the robbers
able to dominate a given geographical region, their system could be
regarded as a legal system, their community as a "state". 50 It would
seem to reflect an unstated, unnecessary, and indefensible Austinian
position that for any given region, there can be only one legal system.
The normative relevance of such a counter-intuitive restriction upon
47. Id. at 47-48. It should be mentioned that Kelsen also argues that the single command of the
gunman is not law because law is not a single norm but a system of norms. Id. at 47. This argument
fails for the same reason that it would be wrong to say that, in mathematics, a collection of one object
cannot be a "set": a single command can be a "system", albeit an extremely simple one. There is no
obvious normative consideration which would serve to distinguish such a simple system from more
complex ones.
48. Id. at 204 n.72.
49. Kelsen's argument that effectiveness is a condition of validity (for norms subsidiary to the
basic norm) is similarly unconvincing. See id. §§ 4c, 34g. It has been noted that the introduction of the
effectiveness requirement in its various forms undercuts Kelsen's formal-logical methodology by the
introduction of contingent facts. SeeR. MOORE, LEGAL NORMS AND LEGAL SCIENCE !96-99 {!978).
50. H. KELSEN, supra note 39, at 48. A similar argument is made by Kelsen with regard to the
status of a coercive order associated with a revolutionary insurgency. !d. § 34f.

16

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

the scope of legal science is difficult to discover. 5 1
Hart
Building upon Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart develops his theory that the
distinctive feature of law is its combination of primary and secondary
rules, the latter including (in particular) a "rule of recognition" analogous in some ways to Kelsen's basic norm. 52 In doing so, he utilizes
an important set of methodological categories:
When a social group has certain rules of conduct, this fact affords
an opportunity for many closely related yet different kinds of assertion; for it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either
merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or as a
member of the group which accepts and uses them as guides to
conduct. We may call these respectively the 'external' and the 'internal points of view'. Statements made from the external point of
view may themselves be of different kinds. For the observer may,
without accepting the rules himself, assert that the group accepts
the rules, and thus may from outside refer to the way in which they
are concerned with them from the internal point of view. But
whatever the rules are, . . . , we can if we choose occupy the position of an observer who does not even refer in this way to the
internal point of view of the group. 53

Hart argues at length that a major defect in much of the earlier theory
is its tendency to opt for the third delineated point of view, which Hart
calls the "extreme external point of view", and is exemplified by attempts to characterize "legal obligation" as referring to no more than
a prediction of the behavior of officials. 54 Thus, Hart writes:
5!. It may be argued that what we have before us is a problem no more difficult (in principle)
than that of distinguishing the bald man from the non-bald man, a problem with which philosophers
are particularly enamored. "Common sense", we are told, allows us to make the distinction, though
obviously we are faced with a case of "continuous variation": there is no particular point at which one
fewer hair makes a man bald. Similarly, these questions about habits of obedience (Austin), by and
large effective coercive orders and public acceptance of basic norms (Kelsen) yield to our "common
sense" in identifying "existing" legal orders and "objectively valid" legal orders. But surely this kind of
resolution is particularly inappropriate to a theoretical perspective. We have seen the reasons already.
A crucial part of jurisprudence must be to ask whether or not these "common sense" distinctions, if
indeed they are such, are well-founded, and in the pursuit of an answer to such questions we would
expect a legal theory to accept, at least tentatively, a perspective which recognizes the contingency and
even variability of such matters as effectiveness and public acceptance. Cf P. NONET & P. SELZNICK,
supra note 18; see also L. FULLER, supra note 36, at 198-200.
52. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW Cbs. V-VI (1961). By a "primary rule" Hart means a
rule directed to all individuals in the social group indicating how the individuals should or should not
act in various circumstances. "Secondary rules" are rules about the primary rules, about how the latter
can be authoritatively identified, changed, or applied to specific cases. Id. at 89-95.
53. Id. at 86-87.
54. Id. at 79-88. See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897):
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At any given moment the life of any society which lives by rules,
legal or not, is likely to consist in a tension between those who, on
the one hand, accept and voluntarily co-operate in maintaining the
rules, and so see their own and other persons' behavior in terms of
the rules, and those who, on the other hand, reject the rules and
attend to them only from the external point of view as a sign of
possible punishment. One of the difficulties facing any legal theory
anxious to do justice to the complexity of the facts is to remember
the presence of both these points of view and not to define one of
them out of existence. Perhaps all our criticisms of the predictive
theory of obligation may be best summarized as the accusation
that this is what it does to the internal aspect of obligatory rules. 55
These are surely reasonable observations, especially as components of a "strong" 56 descriptive theory of developed legal systems.
Indeed, Hart often refers to his theory as going to the "distinctive"
features of modern municipal legal systems. 57 However, when it
comes to delineating the scope of inquiry, by focusing so strongly on
the rule-governed aspect of the behavior of the subjects of investigation
- the actors in a legal system - Hart seems to lose sight of a fact
which the earlier forms of positivism highlighted: among the most important of the principles governing the investigation itself is that our
concept of law should help to illuminate our underlying normative deliberations. The pages of Hart's works are filled with examples of how
this latter dimension is subsumed to the point of isolation from the
concerns of descriptive jurisprudence. For example, in Hart's criticism of a position commonly associated with the natural law tradition,
to the effect that the positive enactments of the state are not "law"
unless they satisfy certain requirements of justice or morality, Hart
reasons from the following premise:
If we are to make a reasoned choice between these concepts [the
broad and narrow concepts of law associated, respectively, with a
rejection or acceptance of the indicated position], it must be because one is superior to the other in the way in which it will assist
our theoretical inquiries, or advance and clarify our moral deliber·
ations, or both. 58
"The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by
law."
55. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 88.
56. See supra note 18.
57. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 16-17,50, 151. It is, of course, rather problematic that Hart
differentiates "distinctive" from such modifiers as "common" or "typical". The former connotes a
conspicuously unexplained normative relevance. This kind of linguistic ambiguity pervades Hart's theory, leading commentators to question its descriptive (positivist) purity. See, e.g., Hill, Legal Validity
and Legal Obligation, 80 YALE L.J. 47, 54-67 (1970).
58. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 204-05. See also id. 208-09.
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Hart's premise reflects the basic positivist duality, a radical separation
of "theoretical" and "moral" investigations. The final "or both" in
the quoted passage appears to recognize only that the choice at issue
may involve both purposes, not that the two purposes are fundamentally intertwined in the way previously described. 59
It is Hart's failure to appreciate this connection which is at the
root of his arguments for rejecting the "gunman" situation as an instance of law. The details on this point are a bit involved, due to the
convolutions of Hart's theory. Roughly, Hart argues that the gunman's command does not involve obligation on the part of his victim
in the way that a law entails obligation on the part of the citizen.
Though Hart repeatedly disavows giving a litmus test for the presence
of law, he does say, in various forms, that where there is law, human
conduct is made obligatory. 60 Hart suggests this, alternatively, as a
fact about common language usage and as an assumption which, presumably, no one would doubt. 61 This sense of obligation is associated
with the internal point of view toward a rule. 62 Yet, in developing
"minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a
legal system", Hart specifies only that some number of persons Hart calls them the "officials" of the system - must take the internal
point of view. 63 One is led, then, to realize that, notwithstanding
Hart's original argument, the only feature in the gunman situation
which precludes its being an instance of a legal system is something
59. It is not necessary to examine here in detail the argument by Hart which appears to proceed
from this premise: he indicates, somewhat cryptically, that there are advantages to employing the
broader concept, for example in terms of citizens' resistance to iniquitous rules. !d. at 203-07. For an
insightful criticism of Hart's argument, with which the present author only partly agrees, see Beyleveld
& Brownsword, Law as a Moral Judgment vs. Law as the Rules of the Powerful, 28 AM. J. JURIS. 105-08
(1983). See also infra note 113 and accompanying text.
60. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, § V.2.
61. !d. at 79-80, 212.
62. !d. at 86-88. This association, it turns out, is extremely problematic. See Hill, supra note 57,
at 58-75. Hill argues forcefully that Hart employs two different analyses of "obligation" in the legal
context: one follows the positivist, value-free tradition and might appropriately be described in terms of
a person's being "legally obliged"; the other follows the tradition of ordinary language philosophy and
is better described in terms of "legal obligation". The former derives its force from legal validity, while
the latter derives its force from principles of justice and morality. In other words, Hill argues for a
distinction between that which has legal validity and that which entails legal obligation, pointing out
that Hart simply assumes the coincidence of these notions. Compare the classical natural law view as
interpreted by J. FINNIS, supra note 15, at 26. Even if we accept Hill's invitation to make this distinction, it is doubtful that Hart's theory gives even an adequate account of legal validity. Cf R. DwoRKIN, supra note 19, Chs. 2-3.
63. H. L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 113-14. There is, of course, a threat of circularity in using the
notion of "official" in marking off legal systems from other social phenomena. See Ladenson, supra
note 32, at 157-59. Elsewhere, Hart seems to try to avoid circularity by characterizing "officials" as
simply "experts" with regard to the rule-system under consideration. H. L.A. HART, supra note 52, at
59.
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about the attitude of the gunman, not the absence of a sense of obligation iri his victim or in the observer of the situation, nor the absence of
"genuine" obligation (i.e. from a universal but internal point of view).
Apparently, if the~e were two gunmen, wh? agreed in advance on the
rules by which theli robbery would be earned out and who used those
rules to criticize each other's conduct, then we would have a legal system. Indeed, behavior can be rule-governed even when the only person engaging in the criticism of deviations is the deviant himself. So if,
for example, the gunman is willing to say to himself, "You idiot, that's
not the way to rob someone!" -again we have a legal system. Hart's
barricade agaifiSt the gunman case crumbles before our eyes, all the
faster once we generalize "rules" to "norms", and admit it to be sufficient if the gunman's actions are purposive, which they typically are. 64
It should be mentioned that Hart specifies a second condition for
the existence of a legal system: the primary rules of behavior must be
"generally obeyed". 65 This requirement suffers from the same defect
as the similar requirements discussed in connection with Austin and
Kelsen, and we are given no reason for such a requirement, at least no
reason besides common usage or perhaps some unspecified "theoreti64. A similar criticism has been directed at Hart's distinction (H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at
89-95) betweerr the "pre-legal" regime- a (hypothetical) society which lacks recognized meta-rules for
identifying, changing, and adjudicating disputes concerning the primary rules of behavior genuinely "legal" system:

and the

Hart may be right in regarding a certain degree of sophistication as essential to a regime's
being a proper legal system, but a strong case could be put forward the other way for
regarding primitive legal systems as genuinely legal and not merely pre-legal. In either case
it is important not to allow the specific differences between the pre-legal regime and the
fully developed legal system to obscure their generic similarities. Legal and pre-legal regimes differ in sophistication, but both have the hallmark of enforceability which distinguishes them from systems of morality and social custom, and both share with morality,
but not etiquette, a high degree of seriousness. Hart's emphasis is different. He stresses the
difference between a fully developed legal system and a pre-legal regime. The important
thing, according to him, about a legal system is that it has certain meta-rules, notably a rule
of recognition, and that the system as a whole is enforced. The effect of this emphasis is to
play down the connection between a fully developed legal system and its roots in a pre-legal
regime and other systems of social control, and to make law appear a much more abstract
and autonomous discipline than it really is.
Lucas, The Phenomenon of Law, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A.
HART 91 (P. Hacker & J. Raz ed. 1977).
65. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 113-14. Actually, the s<tme qualifier ("generally") would
have to be applied by Hart to the other minimum condition, the taking of an internal point of view by
the officials (experts) of the system. Thus, that condition would be (to reword Hart) that the system's
"rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication
must be [generally] accepted as common public standards of official behavior by its officials." Cf id. at
113. This analytical qualifier is necessitated by Hart's focus upon the existence of social rules (primary
and secondary) as the primary fact of legal reality and the consequent necessity of specifying when such
rules exist. The conser;ative implications of Hart's approach are displayed in Dworkin's ctiticism of
Hart. R. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 48-58. Dworkin points out, for example, how perfectly sensible
moral discourse may include appeal to a rule which is not currently and widely followed.

20

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

cal" purpose. 66 It is true that such a reason might be brought forward.
Indeed, Hart's emphasis upon reciprocity as a justification for coercing
deviants who accept benefits but not burdens (of actions to which they
themselves do not consent) might be the basis of a suggestion for the
normative relevance of "generally obeyed" primary rules. 67 But Hart
does not advance this argument, whatever its merits. His socio-linguistic coherence approach to the problem of the nature of law and
legal systems is pursued first; his argument about reciprocity is only
advanced later, as a matter apparently independent of the earlier argument. In any case, aside from the problems of making more precise
the notion of "generally obeyed", the resolution of such a controversial normative question, at the very core of social philosophy, 68 should
not be presumed in setting forth a supposedly neutral characterization
of law and legal systems.
Positivism Reconsidered

If we were to be uncharitable, we would accuse the positivists of
premising their theories, in more and less subtle ways, upon a defense
of the dominant coercive order by allowing the rhetorical power of the
term "law" to that order alone. 69 This would be understandable in
light of the intellectual's typically vested interest in "the Establishment". It might seem particularly consistent with that branch of legal
positivism, exemplified by Kelsen, which reflects extreme skepticism
about the possibility of a rational morality and which might be ex66. Cf. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 100-01 (queries supplied):
[A] general disregard for the rules of the system . . . may be so complete in character and
so protracted that we should [?] say [?], in the case of a new system, that it had never
established itself as the [?]legal system of a given group, or, in the case of a once-established
system, that it had ceased to be the [?]legal system of the group. In either case, the normal
context or background for making any internal statement in terms of the rules of the system
is absent. In such cases it would be generally pointless either to assess the rights and duties
of particular persons by reference to the primary rules of a system or to assess the validity
of any of its rules by reference to its rules of recognition.
Just when and why it would be "generally pointless" is not adequately explained, nor is the definitional
significance of such a contingent fact about an obviously variable efficacy.
67. H. L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 193. See also Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL.
REV. 185 (1955); Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (S.
Hooked. 1964).
68. See, e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 90 et seq. (1974); cf. Greenawalt, Promise, Benefit, and Need: Ties That Bind Us to the Law, 18:4 GA. L. REv. 727, 754-69 (1984).
69. See, e.g., the similar suggestion made in M. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY 55 (1973).
This problem of underinclusiveness seems to be just the opposite of the overinclusiveness which natural
lawyers have found to be a defect of positivism. The classic case of the latter is the positivist claim that
the Nazi rule constituted a legal system. See the Hart-Fuller debate, cited infra notes 107-08. For a
more contemporary version of the anti-positivist criticism, see J. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER Ch. II (1978). How these seemingly contradictory criticisms can be
compatible will become evident in the following discussion.
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pected to oppose any clai~ of.the relevance of normative conc~rns t.o
descriptive theory. 70 But m fa1rness to Kelsen, we must recogmze h1s
emphasis upon the importance of the demystification of the state by its
identification as a coercive social order, the justice of which is open to
question. 71 Conversely, such a motivation might seem inconsistent
with one of the fundamental premises of the utilitarian legal positivism
exemplified by Austin: the necessity of distinguishing law as it is from
law as it ought to be, in order to make possible the moral (utilitarian)
criticism of law. 72 Yet these motivations are not necessarily inconsistent: one can understand the desire of utilitarian (and other) critics to
have a position from which to pressure the dominant coercive forces in
the direction of their proposed reforms without wanting to undermine
general obedience to law, including especially that which they are try.
t o crea t e. 73
mg
More charitably, perhaps, we could attribute the indicated attempts at definitional fiat to the influence of positivism as a general
scientific orientation, one which emphasizes predictivism even with regard to social science methodology. Aside from the general influence
of science and its methodology on modern social thought, it is worth
noting that legal theorists, especially those in the Anglo-American
world, are commonly very familiar with and interested in the training
and functioning of the legal profession. A considerable amount of effort by many "plain men" and their attorneys goes into trying to predict and control the impact of law on their lives. The focus tends to be
upon tactical issues which largely take the panoply of laws as given.
There is good reason to question the desirability of such a predominantly instrumentalist conception of legal cognition among the practicing bar, 74 although in some cases it may be an unavoidable,
defensive reaction to a significant decline in the perceived justness of
the legal system as a whole. When attorneys function in the service of
the state there is the even more worrisome tendency to bring the dispassionate, even Machiavellian, service of the client's "interests" to

plained, nor is the definitional
y.

tny Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL
1 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (S.

70. See D. RICHARDS, supra note 21, at 12-14.
71. See supra note 43.
72. D. RICHARDS, supra note 21, at 14-16.
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73. This explanation fits well with Friedrich Hayek's interpretation of legal positivism as a part
of, or at least readily embraced by, a broader nineteenth and early twentieth century movement to
undermine the "Rule of Law" - i.e., the set of social restraints upon governmental power. These
social restraints (which Hayek calls "meta-legal"), once deprived of legal authority by the positivists'
insistence upon pedigree for a valid law (see supra note 29) could be effectively ignored in the effort to
launch the Welfare State. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY Ch. 16 (1960). Cf M.
KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 18, Ch. 5.
74. For a good discussion, see L. FULLER, "The Needs of American Legal Philosophy," supra
note 21, at 249-60.
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the tactical design of statutes and legal institutions to achieve the goals
of "social policy". 75 And the intensity and insularity of legal education cannot but strongly affect those legal theorists who turn to consider broader questions. 76 The result can be distortion, as exemplified
by the legal realist movement. 77
Hart, we have seen, eschews the behaviorist "extreme external
point of view", presumably in favor of a "theoretical" approach which
entails a non-extreme external point of view. 78 But it is not clear
whether he does so in the spirit of those critics of positivism in social
science who emphasize the importance of a realist understanding (Verstehen) with regard to social phenomena, 19 or whether he does so
merely as a recognition of superior technique in the construction of
social theory within the predictivist/positivist model. 80 In any event,
positivist theorists who take prediction (and the associated power of
control) as the success criterion for a descriptive or scientific theory of
law could harbor the unstated premise that (qualitatively? significantly?) different predictive models are appropriate, useful, efficient,
etc., for such social phenomena as criminal gangs, on the one hand,
and modern bureaucratic states on the other- the term "law" being
applied (for some reason) only to the latter. The premise seems questionable on its face, given the history of such states, but much more
could be said on the matter. 81 Suffice it here to say that it is questionable whether superior predictions can be identified as consequences of
accepting these positivist views. Certainly, the relevance of such a distinction to practical concerns - aside from the prudential importance
75. SeeR. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 2-6. See also Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence
and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 433, 442-44 (1978), in which Summers
discusses the role of social science in the dominant "pragmatic instrumentalism" of American law and
contrasts Lon Fuller's views on the matter.
76. The distortions of legal theory which tend to arise from the training of professional advocates
and representatives have been noted by H. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 12, at 16, and by J. FINNIS,
supra note 15, at 279-80. It is worth noting, for example, that Holmes's much-criticized predictivist
theory of law (supra note 54) was presented in a dedication address at a law school and was directed to
a professional audience.
77. The so-called "legal realists" were members of a complex school of thought which, in its quest
to demystify the law and its judges, is sometimes thought to have amplified the prediction of the behavior of officials into a comprehensi~e jurisprudence within the positivist tradition. See R. SUMMERS,
INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982); for a more sympathetic analysis, see W.
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
78. See Hill, supra note 57, at 54-58, esp. 57 n.45.
79. See, e.g., P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY
(1958); A.R. LOUCH, EXPLANATION AND HUMAN ACTION (1966).
80. See, e.g., R. RUDNER, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 4-5, Ch. 4 (1966). This ambiguity
concerning Hart is mirrored in that concerning his analysis of legal obligation. See supra note 62.
81. See the works cited infra note 145. See also G. POGGI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN
STATE (1978).
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of paying special attentio~ to the behavior ?f ~h.e str?nges~ bully in
towri _is unestablished. Moreover, the predlctlvist onentat10n as the
basis of any social science needs serious critical attention. 82
Perhaps the simplest way to avoid the import of the queries developed here w:ould .be to accep~ th~ positivist's. dist~ncti?ns as nothing
more than discretiOnary exerctses m the selectiOn 01 soctal phenomena
to investigate. Thus, for example, picking coercive orders "by a.nd
large effective" would be no more or less defensible than the biologist's
picking, say, "particularly large" dogs to study. We would want to
know more precisely what the biologist considers "particularly large",
but otherwise we would be inclined, in the spirit of free inquiry, t:..:
accept the biologist's choice. Yet we would not believe there to be any
normative (or other!) significance to the choice- unless, for example,
we were in substantial accord with W.C. Fields on the worth of small
dogs. Similarly, the positivists may be viewed as saying: we want to
study this kind of social phenomenon, and we will call it law simply
because of the facial similarity to ordinary language usage. But noth~
ing of a prescriptive character then follows- certainly not, for exam~
ple, any right to rule or obligation (prima facie or all things
considered) to obey the law. 83 For at this point we have slipped into a
pure conventionalism with regard to the specification of scope of inquiry, looking at most to some form of investigational convenience as
a criterion of selection. 84

B. The Natural Law Tradition
The natural law tradition encompasses a wide range of theories,
from the classical theories of the Greek philosophers, to the theologically based theories of the Middle Ages, to the natural rights theories
of the Enlightenment, and on to the work of several contemporary
82. Consider, e.g., H. Marcuse, Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber, in
NEGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CRITICAL THEORY 223-24 (1968):
Not only the application of technology but technology itself is domination (of nature and
men) - methodical, scientific, calculated, calculating control. Specific purposes and interests of domination are not foisted upon technology "subsequently" and from the outside;
they enter the very construction of the technical apparatus. Technology is al•Nays a historical-social project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with
men and things.

See generally UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY (F. Dallmayr & T. McCarthy ed. 1977); R.
UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976).
83. The extent to which positivists endorse such notions is often difficult to determine. As for
Austin, see supra note 30, at 126-27; re Hart, see infra note 107 and accompanying text. See also J.
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, Part IV (1979), and supra note 32.
84. Compare the similar treatment of conventionalism in M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 8,
18-20 ( 1975). Note also the differences between such conventionalism and the "conceptual pragmatism" employed here. See supra note 12 and accompanying text
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legal philosophers. 85 It is difficult, therefore, to identify a unifying
theme. One to which reference is commonly made is the claim that
there exist rules or principles for the governance of human affairs
which are not of the deliberate making of any human lawgiver. These
rules or principles may be found in divine origin or derived from values inherent in the nature of man, but such theories "agree that all
positive law derives its validity from some rules that have not in this
sense been made by men but which can be 'found' and that these rules
provide both the criterion for the justice of positive laws and the
ground for men's obedience to it. " 86
In this subsection we will consider the relevant implications of the
natural law approach for the specification of the scope of inquiry in
jurisprudence. We will take as our sample the theories of Lon Fuller
and John Finnis, two modern scholars identified with this tradition
who have written extensively on its implications for descriptive legal
theory.
Fuller

Fuller argues for a broadly inclusive concept of law as the "enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules. " 87 He
insists that positivism, by focusing exclusively on the rules which are
the product of this process, fails to attend to law as an ongoing purposive activity. 88 In the course of making his argument, Fuller is generally more explicit about the methodological issues which we have
considered, no doubt partly because of his concern about the underpinnings of positivism as a general philosophical orientation. 89 Thus,
Fuller rejects behaviorism (the extreme external point of view) but appears to remain within a basically scientific perspective. 9 ° For example, he argues for the inclusion within the ambit of law of various
human activities, not commonly thought of as legal, but which also
exemplify the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules: for example, the development of rules governing the internal affairs of non-state institutions like churches, clubs, and trade
85. See generally A.P. o'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW (1951).
86. F. HAYEK, supra note 73, at 237.
87. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 96 (rev. ed. 1969).
88. Id. Ch. 5, e.g., at 193.
89. I d. at 241-42. In particular, Fuller compares his enterprise theory of law with the theorizing
of philosophers and sociologists of science, suggesting that the best way to look at law or science is as an
activity. Id. at 118-22.
90. Id. at IBn, 141, 145-51, 162-67. These passages suggest that Fuller would be appropriately
considered within the Verstehen tradition of social science methodology. See infra notes 79-82 and
accompanying text.
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associations. His defense of this inclusion primarily consists of arguing that:
. a sociologist or philosopher interested primarily in the law of
the state, might study the rules, institutions, and problems of this
body of parietal law for the insight he might thus obtain into the
processes of law generally. 91
It is, then, precisely because the law is a purposeful enterprise that
it displays structural constancies which the legal theorist can discover and treat as uniformities in the factually given. 92

In so arguing, Fuller explicitly displays a healthy refusal to worship at
the idol of ordinary language. 93 Moreover, he provides us with a connection, of the sort called for in this paper, between the normative
concerns of the investigator and the criteria of success of the investigation. Namely, Fuller posits the undeniably legitimate purpose of developing a jurisprudence to "analyze the fundamental problems that
must be solved in creating and administering a system of legal
rules." 94 This purpose is the organizing principle behind Fuller's "internal morality of law" -the set of normative principles which can be
discovered as implicit in, and thereby limiting the effective use of, the
different forms of social ordering, such as legislation, adjudication,
contract, and elections. 95
We may now inquire why this limited normative concern, which
his critics have attacked as a concern for mere effi.cacy, 96 should exhaust the quest for the proper scope of inquiry. As Fuller is prompt to
point out, "the purpose [he has] attributed to the institution of law is a
modest and sober one, that of subjecting human conduct to the guidance and control of general rules. " 97 Assuming, however, that such
modesty with regard to a generic institutional purpose of law is appropriate, there is no reason to translate this limitation directly to the
study of law. In that context, the more general purpose includes, to
paraphrase, the "analysis of fundamental problems that must be
solved in creating and administering a just system oflegal rules". That
in turn requires us (also) to focus attention upon the substantive aims
of legal rules and the coercive sanctions which are typically associated
with them.
91. L. FULLER, supra note 87, at 125.

"law with the theorizing
at law or science is as an

92. !d. at 151.
93. !d. at 122, 129, 195-96, 199, 207.
94. !d. at 122.

would be appropriately
e infra notes 79-82 and

95. ld. Ch. II. See a/soL. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (K. Winston ed. 1981).
96. L. FULLER supra note 87, at 2.00 et seq.
97. !d. at 146.
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This step Fuller refuses to take. 98 He rejects coercion as "a distinguishing mark" oflaw. 99 If this rejection were taken simply to be a
denial of the necessity of coercion as a component of any phenomenon
upon which jurisprudence is to focus, one could easily agree, in view of
Fuller's legitimate concern for the comparative study of institutions
whose rules are not backed by (direct) coercive sanctions. But Fuller's
argument appears to be much stronger, for he denies that the presence
of such coercion is sufficient to bring the matter within the scope of
inquiry. This aspect of Fuller's approach is strikingly incongruous
with his expressed interest in comparative study. If there is a moral
and empirical continuity worthy of study between the social processes
of a rule-governed church organization and those of the law of the
state, why js there not a similar continuity - resulting in a similarly
broad inclusiveness - between reasonably just law of the state and
acts of confiscation behind the facade of "published rules and robed
judges"? 100
Fuller's apparent response to this question is not convincing. He
observes factors which quite reasonably suggest an identification of
law with the use of coercion, but argues that these factors fall short of
a justification for such identification:
In the first place, given the facts of human nature, it is perfectly
obvious that a system of legal rules may lose its efficacy if it permits itself to be challenged by lawless violence. Sometimes violence can only be restrained by violence. Hence it is quite
predictable that there must normally be in society some mechanism ready to apply force in support of law in case it is needed.
But this in no sense justifies treating the use or potential use of
force as the identifying characteristic of law. Modern science depends heavily upon the use of measuring and testing apparatus;
without such apparatus it could not have achieved what it has.
But no one would conclude on this account that science should be
defined as the use of apparatus for measuring and testing. So it is
with law. What law must foreseeably do to achieve its aims is
something quite different from law itself. 101

But could not the same argument be made about all manner of purposive human activity which could not possibly be within our scope of
inquiry? Could artistry be efficacious if it "permits" itself to be challenged by "lawless" violence? Is it not then predictable that there
98. What Fuller does do is to explore the ways in which the normative principles inherent in the
forms of legal ordering constrain the substantive aims attainable through law. E.g., id. Ch. IV.
99. !d. at !08.
100. Paraphrasing from id. at !09.
10!. !d. at !08.

(Vol. 57

s "a disy to be a
wmenon
1 view of
titutions
:Fuller's
presence
scope of
mgruous
a moral
lrocesses
w of the
similarly
tate and
1d robed
~mg.

He
:ation of
short of
fectly
1t per:s viaquite
1echa~eded.

use of
cedetratus;
t has.
uld be
:o it is
ims is

lf purposcope of
be challat there
herent in the
:h. IV.

COERCION Al'..m LEGAL 'fHEOllY

1925]

must normally be in society some mechanism ready to apply force in
support of artistry? ~i{et it is law, not artistry, which provides this
JO?
mechamsm. There is, thus, a peculiar tendency in Fuller's 'Hork to focus on
the noble ideal of law and to ignore its coercive reality. Kt is as if the
latter side of law were shunted aside to avoid contaminating the former. raJ Indeed, this is manifest in the argument vvith vvhich Fuller
continues:
0

Let us test this identification with a hypothetical case. A nation
admits foreign traders within its borders only on condition that
they deposit a substantial sum of money in the national bank guaranteeing their observance of a body of law specially applicable to
their activities. This body of law is administered with integrity
and, in case of dispute, is interpreted and applied by special courts.
If an infraction is established the state pursuant to court order levies a fine in the form of a deduction from the trader's deposit. ·No
force, but a mere bookkeeping operation, is required to accomplish
this deduction; no force is available to the trader that could prevent it. Surely it would be perverse to deny the term "law" to such
a system merely because it had no occasion to use force or tht
threat of force to effectuate its requirements. 104

This rather bizarre failure to recognize the significance of the coercion
directly employed in conditioning the foreign trader's ability to come
within the national boundaries on the deposit- i.e. threatening c.or:::cive acts in the event the foreigner attempts to trade ;;;vithout n1.aking
it 105 - confirms that Fuller has a separate normative criterion of :me>
!02. Compare Roberto Unger's remark, drawing on the work of Talcott Parsons:
Many things besides law may fit into the category of normative order; for example, a society's religion and art. To the extent that law can be differentiated from these other aspects
of normative order, it is distinguished by its primary emphasis on externally observable
behavior and on the use of secular sanctions to penalize or redress deviant con duet.
R. UNGER, supra note 82, at 57. My point here is not to deny that reflections on the purpose of
institutions can sometimes be used to isolate an "essence" thereof, but rather to point out that in the
analytical process of that isolation for legal institutions, the instrumentality of coercion is a defining
consideration. Any "essence" of law, if one can be identified, must focus upon the problems of coercive
interaction among people.
103. Consider L. FULLER, supra note 87, at 156:
We [colonial Americans] were f01tunate that we had learned from our British teachers
something of the need for law and for preserving its integrity and force. Much of the world
today yearns for justice without having undergone a similar tutelage. There was never a
time that could reveal more plainly the vacuity of the view that law simply expresses a
datum of legitimated social power. Nor was there ever a time when it was more dangerous
to take that view seriously.
!04. I d. at !09.
105. It should be clear that Fuller's argument and the present criticism thereof are distinct from
controversies concerning the individuation of laws, i.e. the determination of which and how much legal
material makes up one law. See J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM Ch. IV (1980).
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cess in specifying his notion of law. This criterion does not appear on
the face of the formula, "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct
to the governance of rules", nor in an untortured interpretation of his
underlying normative concern about the fundamental problems that
must be solved in creating and administering a system of rules. 106
In fact, there is an underlying requirement that the notion of law
entail a moral obligation of fidelity thereto, an obligation which Fuller
takes as axiomatic. It is this requirement which leads Fuller to balk at
the inclusion of the gunman within the domain of legal phenomena.
And it is striking that Fuller, so at odds with the positivists for their
more subtle attempts, nevertheless similarly attempts. to delimit the
scope of inquiry by a kind of definitional fiat. Fuller's logic in this
regard can be most easily seen in his earlier debate with Hart in the
Harvard Law Review. There, Fuller observes that Hart, while denying
any necessary connection between law as it is and law as it ought to be,
nevertheless accepts the prima facie moral duty of "fidelity" to law. 107
Fuller's reaction to this oddity is to assert the necessary connection
rather than to give up the obligation. 108 While that is a conceivable
remedy for the inconsistency apparent in Hart's position, it is obviously not the only one. 109 Fuller argues as though it were.
We may suggest a resolution of this conflict which, though it
might not be entirely to Fuller's liking, is nonetheless a happy one. It
is based once more upon the distinction between definition and theory,
or, as we have developed it here, between the scope of the inquiry and
the theoretical formulations therein. We may take Fuller's liberalizing
extensions to be related to scope of inquiry, and his delimitations as
related to his theoretical formulation based upon aspirations toward
an "ideal" form. If one takes such an approach, Fuller's rejection of
coercive interaction as a type of legal phenomenon falls away. Moreover, within the domain of inquiry legal phenomena may more easily
be understood as manifesting the variable "legality" (internal morality) which Fuller emphasizes. 110 Of course, that does not eliminate the
106. Fuller characterizes this "procedural" natural law as an elaboration of seventeenth century
English law of due process, distinguishing its concerns from issues of substantive justice. L. FULLER,
supra note 87, at 96 et seq.
107. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
This is a problem which has afflicted legal positivists generally. See SOCIETY, LAw AND MoRALITY
435-37 (F. Olafson ed. 1961). It should be noted that Hart's position on this matter seems to have
changed. See Lyons, supra note I, at 730-33.
108. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law- A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630
(1958).
109. See Hill's resolution of Hart's confusions, supra note 57.
110. L. FULLER, supra note 87, at 122-23, 198-200. Such variable legality can be important in a
variety of ways, not the least of which is as a component of the determination of the existence of an
obligation to obey a given rule of law. There is no reason to identify such a determination with the
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fundamental difference of opinion between him and the positivists at
the level of theory construction. 111 Perhaps the extent to which those
persons taking an internal point. ~f .vie"'_' have or oug~t to have ~ positivist view of law or the non-pos1t1v1st v1ew of law whiCh Fuller mstantiates is itself a matter for empirical and normative inquiry into the
emergence and decay of two (perhaps among many) ideal types, in this
case types of legal ideologies. 112 If so, we may take Fuller's argument
as one to the effect that his view of law is a superior working conception, especially for those with the internal point of view, because of the
attention it focuses upon certain aspirational ideals. 113
Before leaving our discussion of Fuller, and notwithstanding the
reconciliatory suggestions just made, it will be helpful to illustrate how
Fuller's minimization of the significance of coercion leads to analytical
peculiarities suggestive of the decisional program criticized in the introduction of this paper. 114 In discussing the relation of morality and
law, Fuller considers the example of gambling, indicating the mode of
analysis that a "hypothetical moral legislator" would employ in deciding whether or not gambling should be condemned as immoral, in the
sense of its constituting a breach of a moral duty. 115 After developing
this analytical approach, involving primarily considerations of the
harmfulness of gambling to oneself and others, Fuller continues:
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How is such a moral judgment related to the question of whether
gambling ought to be prohibited by law? The answer is, very diJ:"ectly. Our hypothetical legislator of morals could shift his mle to
that of lawmaker without any drastic change in his methods of
judgment. As a lawmaker he will face certain questions that as a
moralist he could conveniently leave to casuistry. He will have to
decide what to do about games of skill or games in which the outcome is determined partly by skill and partly by chance. As a statutory draftsman he will confront the difficulty of distinguishing
between gambling for small stakes as an innocent amusement and
determination of whether "iaw" or "legal system" exists, although Fuller occassionally seems to be
suggesting identity. See, e.g., id. at 39-41. Also, in making his arguments that substantial failure along
some of the dimensions of internal morality can result in no law at all, Fuller identifies "law" and "legal
system" and conf!ates the existence of an enterprise to make rules with the rules which the enterprise is
attempting to make. Id. at 41, 122, 197-200. Perhaps it is more reasonable to reserve the concept of
a legal system" to refer to a successful enterprise, though there would be serious problems in identifying
the criteria of "success" in this context, as the preceding discussion of positivist views has
demonstrated.
11 1. See Fulier's discussion of the "ideal types" constituted by the positivist "managerial theory
of law" and his own "intendments" or "reciprocity" theory of law. I d. at 207 et seq.
112. See Nonet, The Legitimation of Purposive Decisions, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1980).
113. Fuller's arguments often suggest such an interpretation. See. e.g., Fuller, supra note 108, at
631-32, 637.
114. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
115. L. FULLER, supra note 87, at 5-9.
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gambling in its more desperate and harmful forms. If no formula
comes readily to hand for this purpose, he may be tempted to draft
his statute so as to include every kind of gambling, leaving it to the
prosecutor to distinguish the innocent from the truly harmful.
Before embracing this expedient, often described euphemistically
as "selective enforcement," our moralist turned lawmaker will
have to reflect on the dangerous consequences that would attend a
widened application of that principle, already a pervasive part of
the actual machinery of law enforcement. Many other considerations of this nature he would have to take into account in drafting
and proposing his statute. But at no point would there be any
sharp break with the methods he followed in deciding whether to
condemn gambling as immoral. 116

What is peculiar about this passage is that there is no clue as to why
the hypothetical lawmaker must face these "certain questions" which
the moralist could avoid. It seems clear that the coercive sanction is
the source of the additional concern, but it is hard to find this in
Fuller's explanation. 117 On the whole, Fuller suggests no serious discontinuity between the "legislative" considerations of (non-legal)
moral duty and those of legal duty. This can easily be associated with
a view that any act constituting a breach of a moral duty is appropriately proscribed by law, aside from certain, seemingly incidental matters c("casuistry") concerrung the fair administration of the
proscription. 118

Finn is
The final theorist to be considered is John Finnis, who has attempted to revitalize and improve the classical natural law of Aristotle
116. Id. at 7-8.
117. One might be tempted to say that there are obvious considerations of constitutional law, or
its analogues in the jurisprudence of non-constitutional states, which constrain the lawmaker differentially. But that, of course, only pushes the inquiry back a step, requiring us to explain the reason(s) for
the constitutional concerns.
118. In fairness to Fuller, it should be pointed out that another part of his theory illustrates his
concern about moralistic authoritarianism and provides something of a barrier thereto. Indeed, the
main thrust of the gambling example is to illustrate the difference between "the morality of aspiration"
(based upon the effort to live fully and well) and "the morality of duty" (based upon the effort to limit
one's actions in the minimal ways necessary for communal life). For Fuller, the former bears a close
affinity to the substantive aims of law, the latter to the "internal morality of law". L. FULLER, supra
note 87, Chs. 1-11. If Fuller's only point is that the moral considerations concerning the substantive
aims of law are properly much more like those of the morality of duty than those of the morality of
aspiration, then perhaps the present criticism is misdirected. Moreover, since Fuller deplores much of
the moral escalation by which moral aspirations become moral duties (id. at 10), it is clear that his
general inclination is to keep the category of moral duties relatively small and thereby restrict the
category of candidates for the duties of citizens under substantive law. See also id. at 132-33, Ch. IV;
Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 21, at
67.
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and Aquinas. 119 Finnis ~isplays a highly de.ve~oped appreciation of
·the interaction of normatiVe theory and descnptlVe theory. Although
there are serious points of disagreement between Finnis and the present author on the requirements of "practical reasonableness" (the
foundation of natural law), Finnis's approach to the relevance of such
a normative theory to descriptive theory is in substantial accord with
that employed here. As we shall see, however, Finnis does not take his
approach quite far enough, at least not explicitly.
In reviewing the trend of jurisprudence in this area, Finnis recognizes the progressively greater incorporation of attention to the practical point of legal institutions into the theoretical constructs of modern
jurists, including in particular Austin, Kelsen, Hart, and Fuller. 120 He
explains this natural impetus by way of a general principle, drawn
from Aristotle and Weber, for descriptive analysis of social phenomena: description can best proceed by way of comparison of extant legal
practices, conceptions, and institutions with the "central case" (or "focal meaning") thereof, i.e. the legal conceptions and institutions hypothetically developed by the exercise of practical reasonableness.'2 1 His
definition of law, 122 evolving over several chapters of his book, constitutes what he claims to be such a central case, "not as an approximation of the term 'law' in a univocal sense that would exclude from the
reference of the term anything that failed to have all the characteristics
(and to their full extent) as the central case." 123 Contrasts with this
central case are not properly employed "to banish the other noncen119. See J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
120. /d. § 1.2. It should be remembered that the term "practical" is used by Finnis, as by the
present author, in the sense of "with a view to decision and action", not in the sense of "workable" or
"efficient". /d. at 12.
121. /d. at§§ L3-L4. For reasons which are not entirely clear, Finnis restricts the viewpoint from
which to hypothetically elaborate his conception to that "in which legal obligation is treated as at least
presumptively a moral obligation". /d. at 14. This restriction may be unnecessary. See Beyleveld &
Brownsword, supra note 59, at 115-17.
122. The full characterization is as follows:
[T]he term 'law' has been used with a focal meaning so as to refer primarily to rules made,
in accordance with regulative legal rules, by a determinate and effective authority (itself
identified and, standardly, constituted as an institution by legal rules) for a 'complete' community, and buttressed by sanctio~s in accordance with the rule-guided stipulations of adjudicative institutions, this ensemble of rules and institutions being directed to reasonably
resolving any of the community's co-ordination problems (and to ratifying, tolerating, regulating, or overriding co-ordination solutions from any other institutions or sources of
norms) for the common good of that community, according to a manner and form itself
adapted to that common good by features of specificity, minimization of arbitrariness, and
maintenance of a quality of reciprocity between the subjects of the law both amongst themselves and in their relations with the lawful authorities.
J. FINNIS, supra note 119, at 276-77. As already mentioned, I have some serious problems with the
details of this characterization, in particular as to the supposedly rational nature of the need for "complete community". See id. § VI.6. Discussion of these problems must await another occasion.
123. /d. at 277.
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tral cases to some other discipline." 124 Finnis explains:
There is thus a movement to and fro between, on the one hand,
assessments of human good and of its practical requirements, and
on the other hand, explanatory descriptions (using all appropriate
historical, experimental, and statistical techniques to trace all relevant causal interrelationships) of the human context in which
human well-being is variously realized and variously ruined. . . .
There is thus a mutual though not quite symmetrical interdependence between the project of describing human affairs by way of
theory and the project of evaluating human options with a view, at
least remotely, to acting reasonably and well. The evaluations are
in no way deduced from the descriptions; but one whose knowledge of the facts of the human situation is very limited is unlikely
to judge well in discerning the practical implications of the basic
values. Equally, the descriptions are not deduced from the evaluations; but without the evaluations one cannot determine what descriptions are really illuminating and significant. 125
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Indeed, unless some such normative theory is developed, Finnis
argues:
analytical jurisprudence in particular and (at least the major part
of) all the social sciences in general can have no critically justified
criteria for the formation of general concepts, and must be content
to be no more than manifestations of the various concepts peculiar
to particular peoples and/or to the particular theorists who concern themselves with those people. 126

This much seems reasonable and is at least consistent with the
approach taken here. 127 Moreover, it purports to resolve the tension
between Fuller and the positivists which we left incompletely resolved
in our earlier discussion: 128 Finnis here seems to argue- rather convincingly- that practically relevant, and hence adequate, descriptive
theory construction must proceed in conjunction with an increasingly
refined elaboration of the ideal manifestation of law, precisely in the
sense that the better one's development of such an ideal conception of
law, the more informative can be one's description of existing legal
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124. !d. at 278.
125. !d. at 17, 19.
126. !d. at 18.
127. Finnis's argument is not without its ambiguities. His reliance upon Weber, in particular, is
confusing in that Weber held that his "ideal type", though formed inevitably under the influence of a
theorist's perceptions of importance, does not entail a moral judgment that it is normatively ideal. See
Gavison, Natural Law, Positivism, and the Limits of Jurisprudence: A Modern Round (Book Review),
191 YALE L.J. 1250, 1264-70 (1982).
128. See supra text accompanying notes I I 1-13.
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129

systems.
Nevertheless, at least one crucial modification is necessary. lit
must at some point be specified for which social phenomena one is
developing a central case to use as a standard for comparison. One
needs, in other words, a specification of the scope of inquiry. The argument presented here is that this specification should be based not
simply upon the unfocused usages of ordinary language but upon a
more critical reflection. It is itself a matter for the resonant "movement to and fro" of normative and descriptive theory. Finnis has little
to say about this, but he does recognize the "main features" of a legal
order out of which to construct the focal meaning:
So it is that legal order has two broad characteristics, two characteristic modes of operation, two poles about which jurisprudence
and 'definitions of law' tend to cluster. They are exemplified by
the contrast between Weber's formal definition of law and his extensive employment of the term 'legal'; and they can be summed
up in two slogans: 'law is a coercive order' and 'the law regulates
its own creation'. 130
Thus Finnis appears to take a very liberally inclusive domain within
which one can examine particular social phenomena "without ignoring or banishing to another discipline the undeveloped, primitive, corrupt, deviant, or other 'qualified sense' or 'extended sense' instances of
the subject matter." 131 Indeed, Finnis accepts the intelligibility and
usefulness of speaking of the law of a "gang", 132 although there is little
to suggest that Finnis would be willing to extend that usage to include
the interaction of the "gang" with outsiders. 133
Had Finnis examined this matter more extensively, perhaps he
would not have played down the significance of coercion as much as
129. The point was presaged by Fuller, at least with regard to the various forms of social ordering
characteristic of law. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 357
(1978). Contrary to at least one of Finnis's critics on this point, he does not claim that one cannot
(logically) have any conception of law or legal systems which is not proffered as a normatively (morally)
ideal conception. Cf. Gavison, supra note 127.
130. J. FINNIS, supra note 119, at 270.
131. Id. at II.
132. Id. at 148. It has been known for some time, for example, that:
[l]n the Mafia and Camorra, rules are adopted and orders are issued; there are regular ways
of hearing charges of violation and rendering judgments, as by the Grand Council of the
Camorra of Naples, followed by the action of previously designated personnel imposing
very severe physical sanctions, including death, razor slashes across the face, severe beatings, and the like, sometimes with the approval and support of the community.
1. HALL, supra note 2, at 110 (citations omitted).

133. It is worth mentioning, for example, that Peter Reuter has studied the mafia as a service
agency for the resolution of disputes between outsiders arising from transactions in "illegal" markets.
Informal talk, Center for the Study of Law and Society, U.C. Berkeley (October 3, 1980).
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he does. This section concludes with an (unavoidably lengthy) example which serves to illustrate how Finnis seems to fall into a potentially
authoritarian strain of jurisprudence, manifesting the kind of flawed
decisional process described in the introduction to this paper. 134 In his
interesting discussion of the concepts of justice, Finnis rightly criticizes a certain miscategorization (based upon a sixteenth century misreading of Aquinas by Cajetan) of the types of justice, which leads to
the erroneous conclusion that "distributive" justice pertains only to
relations of the state to its citizens, whereas "commutative" justice
pertains only to relations among the citizens. 135 The error is seen by
recognizing that there are issues of distributive justice in the relationships among citizens, and that there are commutative justice issues in
the relationship of the state to the citizen. Though this point is fairly
obvious, Finnis argues that missing it continues to be a common part
of modem thinking. As confirmation of this claim, Finnis cites Robert
Nozick's arguments in favor of an "entitlement" theory of justice in
holdings and the argument against redistributive taxation that is derived therefrom. 136
Nozick's principle of justice in holdings is that holdings are just
which are justly acquired from an unowned state or justly received
from someone else who held them justly. Moreover, the only justification for taking such just holdings from someone to give to another
arises under a principle of "rectification" for a (sufficiently serious)
wrong done to the recipient by the person being taken from, with appropriate accounting for wrongs done between predecessors. Finnis
criticizes this theory as manifesting the previously described erroneous
view, in particular the view that relations between citizens invoke only
commutative justice concerns. 137 There are several things wrong with
Finnis's criticism. 138 Most importantly, for our purposes, Nozick fre134. See supra text accompanying note 5.
135. J. FINNIS, supra note 119, § VII.6. Actually, the criticized view has a third dimension, not
relevant to the present discussion: "legal justice" concerns the relationship of the citizen to the state
and "is little more than the citizen's duty of allegiance to the State and its laws." Jd. at 186. For
readers unfamiliar with the distinction between commutative and distributive justice, Fii:mis provides a
good discussion. !d. §§ VII.3-VII. 7.
136. See R. NOZICK, supra note 68, Ch. 7.
137. J. F!NNIS, supra note 119, at 186-88.
138. A point not directly germane to the present discussion but obvious enough to be mentioned
is that Nozick clearly does not endorse the view that Finnis apparently attributes to him, for Nozick
explicitly indicates a role, albeit a subsidiary one, for the principles of distributive justice in dealing with
special problems of rectification - namely, situations in which the principle of rectification unaided by
such distributive principles yields a non-unique prescription. See R. NoziCK, supra note 68, at 153n.
Strikingly, Finnis ignores this caveat in exactly the kind of situation to which presumably it was directed- the case of multiple creditors of an insolvent debtor. See J. FINNIS, supra note I 19, § VU.7.
Conversely, outside the context of wealth transfers, Nozick's arguments emphasize the "moral sideconstraints" which limit the legitimate actions of everyone, including the state (R. NoZICK, supra note
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uently reminds the reader that justice in terms of what may be required of someone under threat of coercion is distinct from justice in
[erms of what one ought voluntarily to do; his entire book is concerned
with the limitations upon the use of coercion as a means to various
ends. 139 So it is hard to imagine Nozick denying that relations between citizens may indeed invoke distributive justice concerns. Yet,
according to Nozick, such concerns do not figure directly in the justification of coercive transfers of just holdings, not because such concerns
~re unthinkable in this context, but primarily because if they were employed in this context, it would amount to a kind of enforced
servitude. 140
With these points in mind, consider the continuation of Finnis's
criticism:
[T]he plausibility of . . . [Nozick's] argument comes entirely from
its focus on the coercive nature of the State's intervention as the
agent of (re)distributive justice. Suppose we abandon this perspective. That is to say: leave the State out of consideration for a moment, and ask instead whether a private property-holder has duties
of (re)distributive justice. (The question is strictly inconceivable in
the post-Cajetan tradition.) Then we will find that Nozick has little indeed to say in favour of his assumption that what one has
justly acquired one can justly hold without regard for the needs,
deserts, or other claims of others (except such claims as one has
actually created, e.g. by contract, which one has a duty to satisfy in
what I, not Nozick, would call commutative justice). If we see no
reason to adopt his assumption that the goods of the earth can
reasonably be appropriated by a few to the substantial exclusion of
all others, and if we prefer instead the principle that they are to be
treated by all as for the benefit of all according to the criteria of
distributive justice though partly through the mediation of private
68, Part I, esp. Ch. 3); the obvious commutative justice concerns involved here belie the claim that
Nozick adheres to a view giving no scope to such concerns in relations of the state to the citizen.
"'!!~-~······· ...B..eyond these points, I will avoid excessive digression by simply stating, without defense, that Finnis
misunderstands Nozick's claim that "things" come into the world already attached to people having
entitlements over them, so that both "distribution" and "redistribution" are misleading paradigms to
invoke in describing the state's activities in the large scale transfer of wealth. See J. FINNIS, supra note
119, at 187, esp. n.30. Moreover, Finnis's discussion fails to appreciate the significance of Nozick's
endorsement of a "Lockean proviso" limiting acquisitions. See R. NOZICK, supra note 68, at 174-82.
139. Nozick writes in his Preface: "Two noteworthy implications are that the state may not use
its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, . . . . [O]nly coercive
routes toward these goals are excluded while voluntary ones remain . . . ." R. NOZICK, supra note 68,
at ix. And at the beginning of his discussion of "distributive" justice, he adds: "a principle of justice in
holdings describes (part a/) what justice tells us (requires) about holdings." !d. at !50 (emphasis
supplied).
140. !d. at 167-74. Finnis explicitly recognizes this as the main thrust of Nozick's argument J.
FINN IS, supra note I 19, at 186.
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holdings, then the question of State coercion, which dominated
Nozick's argument, becomes in principle of very secondary importance. For in establishing a scheme of redistributive taxation, etc.,
the State need be doing no more than crystallize and enforce duties
that the property-holder already had. Coercion, then, comes into
play only in the event of recalcitrance that is wrongful not only in
law but also in justice. 141

In view of Finnis's claim about conceptual confusion, he must be doing more here than simply disagreeing with Nozick's opinions about
distributional equity. It seems that Finnis is straightforwardly arguing
that a moral obligation, at least if falling within the rubric of justice, is
ipso facto an obligation which may properly be backed by coercive
sanctions, such sanctions being "of very secondary importance." In so
doing, it is clear that it is Finnis, not Nozick, who has stumbled as the
result of a conceptual confusion. For even if one assumes that under
appropriate circumstances a just (according to Nozick's principles of
just acquisition al!d transfer) holder of entitlements has a moral duty
(in justice) to distribute holdings to others, it does not follow (without
more) that it is permissible to coerce him into making such a distribution. 142 At the very least, Finnis's criticism presupposes an unspecified resolution of the long-standing controversy about the enforcement
of morality. 143

III.

SOME ELABORATION OF THE THESIS AND POTENTIAL

OBJECTIONS

In the theories discussed in the preceding section, one witnesses
two countervailing tendencies. On the one hand there is the inclination, well explained by Finnis, to narrow the concept of law by progressively incorporating more of the "practical point" of proper legal
enterprise into the very articulation of the nature of law. On the other
hand there is the tendency, reflected variously in the works of the writ141. J. FINNIS, supra note I 19, at 187.
142. I take it to be uncontroversial, or at least not controverted by Finnis, that while justice is not
coextensive with morality, justice is also not coextensive with the morality of law. That is, there are
moral concerns relevant to law which are not matters of justice, and there are justice concerns in many
non-legal matters. See H. L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 153-63; cf J. FINNIS, supra note I 19, §VII. I.
Thus, Finnis's conclusion is not analytically true by virtue of the meaning of 'justice'.
143. See, e.g., J. FEINBERG, supra note 22, Chs. 2-3. The "something more" might be entailed in
Finnis's peculiar reference in the quoted passage to the recalcitrance being "wrongful . . . in law", but
if so there is much more to be said than Finnis does here. It should also be clear that the foregoing
criticism of Finnis, and pro tallto defense of Nozick, does not presume that Nozick's theory of justice in
holdings is correct, though in fact I believe it largely to be. Finally, it has not been my purpose to argue
that Finnis's conception of law logically requires the mistaken criticism of Nozick; just as Finnis was
trying to show (in Nozick) the continuing influence of a sixteenth century mistake, I have tried to show
(in Finnis) the continuing influence of a twentieth century mistake, a mistake of emphasis.
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ers discussed, to open up the conception to comparative study which
does not limit the connections to be developed or prejudge important
practical issues. The present essay attempts to resolve this tension by
accepting that these theorists have actually been pursuing two distinguishable but interrelated goals: that of specifying the scope of legal
inquiry- the "province of jurisprudence", in Austin's terms- and
that of developing, within such "province", more elaborated theories
of law which can be useful in the analysis of the practical issues of
. 144
concern to t he t heonst.
By focusing upon the former goal, the attainment of which is analytically prior to the aitainment of the second, it has been argued that
coercion is indeed as important as the early positivists seemed to suggest, though not perhaps in exactly the way they suggested. We have
observed the evolution of modern jurisprudential thought to a point
where the imposition of rules by a robber gang is accepted, at least by
some theorists, as an instance of legal phenomena. This reflects a subtle forward stride in the process of unmasking putatively authoritative,
but undeniably coercive, actions by the state. 145 Speculative legal
thought, whether descriptive or prescriptive, must indeed take more
seriously the normative question of the distinguishability of the gunman and the taxman as those persons are encountered in reality. We
must, even if only as a tentative analytical device, look upon the emperor without the clothes of "authority". 146 Accordingly, legal theory
should map out a domain of inquiry which properly reflects the quintessential normative questions for legal philosophy, including in particular the justification of coercion 147 and of responses thereto. 148 It
should be clear, then, that a much closer connection must be stressed
144. See supra note 18. It is, of course, plausible to use the term "definition" to refer to either of
these two goals; one can, for example, point out that elaborated descriptive or prescriptive theories
attempt to "gain definition" with respect to law.
145. This revision process has a long and distinguished history. See, e.g., A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS {1976) {first published in 1776); F.
BASTIAT, SELECTED EsSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (1964) {first published between 1845 and 1850);
A. HERBERT, THE RIGHT AND WRONG OF COMPULSION BY THE STATE {1976) {first published between 1880 and 1908); A NEW HISTORY OF LEVIATHAN (R. Radosh & M. Rothbard ed. 1972); F.A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY {Vol. I 1973) {Vol. 2 1976) (Vol. 3 1979) (containing voluminous bibliographical notes). It has already been noted that Kelsen should be viewed in this light. See
supra note 43.
146. See, e.g., Nisbet, Cloaking the State's Dagger, REASON, October, 1984, at 42, an adaptation
from the forthcoming FAIR OF SPEECH: THE USES OF EUPHEMISM, (D.J. Enright ed., Oxford U .
Press).
147. See generally J. FEINBERG, supra note 22. On the right to rule, see the articles by Ladenson
and Raz, supra note 32, and R. NoziCK, supra note 68. Of course, one descriptive element within the
normative inquiry, which would be central in the view of descriptive legal theory presented here, is the
matter of the effectiveness of coercive sanctions in establishing conduct in conformity with rules. See,
e.g., M. ROTHBARD, POWER AND MARKET: GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY {1970); C. STOl-lE,
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between legal theory and political theory than has been generally recognized in modern legal philosophy. 149
It may be objected, however, that I have misconstrued the controversy surrounding the question, "What is law?" The main methodological thesis presented here focuses upon the sufficiency of coercion
to place the interaction in question within the domain of inquiry. But
many have taken the question to call for a specification of the "essential qualities" of law, or the necessary features of law. Indeed, it would
seem that the criticism directed in this paper at legal decision-making
programs which do not keep firmly in mind the coercive reality of the
decision to be made presupposes that coercion is a necessary feature of
law, if not of particular laws. 150 Moreover, several theorists have developed arguments demonstrating that social phenomena which lack
coercion, yet ought to be considered law, can be hypothetically identified by focusing upon the needs of a society of angels. The general
argument is that, even though sanctions would not be necessary to
assure compliance in such a society, nevertheless basic coordination
problems would still exist, due to honest differences of opinion, which
would generate the practical need for authoritative resolutions sufficiently "legal" in character to be appropriately called law. Consequently, it is argued, coercion is not a conceptually (analytically)
necessary feature either of law or a legal system, though it may be a
naturally (pragmatically) necessary feature under any set of conditions
mere mortals are likely to encounter. 151 This is an important point,
according to Professor Oberdiek, because we may come to see
that coercion and sanctions are over-used techniques for insuring
compliance and that they may be largely replaced by promotional
techniques. We can . . . say now, on conceptual grounds, that law
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975); J. KAPLAN, THE
HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983).
148. See, e.g., Symposium, The Duty to Obey the Law, 18:4 GA. L. REV. (1984); M. RoTHBARD,
THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1982), esp. Cbs. 12, 24. For an interesting analysis of the significance of
such questions for descriptive legal theory, see M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 18, esp. Ch. 5.
149. A noteworthy .recent publication is generally responsive to the call made in this paper.
Philip Soper's A THEORY OF LAW (1984) seems to carry the argument made here beyond the stage of
determining the scope of inquiry to elaborating a theory (which unfortunately he calls a "definition";
see supra note 144 and accompanying text) of law which also attempts to draw lines of normative
relevance. In doing so, Soper criticizes the modem positivists and natural lawyers on grounds similar
at many points to those presented here. He also demonstrates the necessity of integrating legal and
political theory by focusing upon the practical issues ofthe citizen's and the official's choices of what to
do. The relative newness and depth of this work has precluded major treatment of its constructive
component here. For a critical review, see Raz, The Morality of Obedience, 83 MICH. L. REv. 732
(1985).
150. See supra text accompanying note 5.
151. See, e.g., Oberdiek, supra note 23, at 71; J. RAz, supra note 3, at 158-60; J. FINNIS, supra
note 119, Cbs. IX-X, esp. 260-61.
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Replying to these objections will allow us to complete the defini. nal structure for legal theory proposed here. First, it has been rectiO ized for some time that "[i]t may well be the case that there is no
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necessary and jointly sufficient cond1t10ns for the_ truth of A legal system exists in S.' There may instead be several different, though overlapping, sets of sufficient conditions. In other words, there may be
more than one way for something to qualify as a legal system." 153 Advocates of the "necessary conditions" approach may argue that one
ought not to give up the search for necess_ary and jointly sufficient
conditions absent a proof that they do not exist. Indeed, the argument
that coercion is not necessary is usually framed in such a way as to
suggest what is necessary. Thus, as in the recurring hypothetical society of angels, the concept of coordination problems seems to isolate the
necessary condition. 154 Yet, it would seem that another hypothetical
society can be imagined in which there is no need for authoritative
determination of rules - because everyone agrees on what they are
and should be -but in which occasional weakness of will makes sanctions practically necessary. 155 The argument against coercion, assuming it is sound, thus seems equally applicable to the most likely other
candidate for a necessary condition. 156 It remains rather problematic,
152. Oberdiek, supra note 23, at 74. Similarly, Philip Selznick has made comparisons of legal
development to Piaget's notion of individual development from a morality of constraint to a morality of
cooperation. SeeP. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 18 et seq. (1969). Of course,
one must be suspicious of suggestions that seem to entail a reduction in the coercive aspect of a legal
system; they may entail merely shifting of the situs of coercion. For example, one could imagine a
system employing "positive incentives" or "rewards" for persons to act in ways considered non-criminal, rather than imposing sanctions for criminal acts. But if one asks where the money to pay these
rewards is to come from, one discovers that the coercion is simply to be shifted from the would-be
criminals to the taxpayers opposed to the program - unless, of course, the reward system pays for
itself by virtue of savings attributable, for example, to not having to put the criminal through the
possibly more elaborate legal process necessary to impose a sanction.
153. M. GOLDING, supra note 84, at 8. Professor Golding's approach in fact instantiates the
possibility described in the quoted passages, although his sufficiency conditions do not resemble those
described here. !d. at 9-17. His approach is not considered in detail here, in part because one of his
conditions (it turns out to be a necessary condition) is the existence of laws, a condition which presents
difficult problems of circularity.
154. See generally E. ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977).
155. Note that arguments in favor of the abdication of autonomy can be grouped into two analogous categories: "(!) autonomy-abdication in exchange for significant benefits; (2) autonomy-abdication to protect against self-acknowledged irrationality." Kuf!ik, The Inalienability of Autanomy, 13:4
PHIL & PuB. AFF. 271, 284 (1984). Compare Aquinas' two reasons for positive law, discussed in J.
FtNNts, supra note 119, at 28-29.
156. There are other reasons to doubt the definitional centrality of the coordination function of
law. See Green, Law, Coordination. and the Common Good, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1983).
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therefore, whether any condition or feature is conceptually necessary
to law. 157
Moreover, even if one or more necessary conditions, or even an
"essence", can be identified at the level of construction of a full-blown
theory of law, it can still be best to endorse the above-quoted view at
the level of scope of inquiry determination. 158 The present paper does
so, emphasizing one of the overlapping sufficiency conditions: the employment of coercion. In the process, we have adverted to another:
the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of
rules. 159 Following the advice of Fuller, the formulation of each condition emphasizes the practical focus by use of an active terminology,
thus reflecting the significance of human action in our normative deliberations. 160 If, therefore, one were to seek a slogan to characterize the
theory presented here, (part of) it would be something like "law as the
!57. Much more can be said on this point. See the very interesting article by Professors Beyleveld
and Brownsword, supra note 59.
158. Some of those who make the "necessity" argument appear to be aware of the separate need
for a proper delineation of the scope of inquiry. Professors Beyleveld and Brownsword, for example, in
setting the stage for their analysis of the positivism/natural law debate as a controversy over the proper
"real" (i.e., "transcendental") definition or conception of law, specify that (following Fuller) "the general subject matter of the study of law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance
of rules". Beyleveld & Brownsword, supra note 59, at 100. On the other hand, reflecting the other
sufficient condition endorsed here, their recharacterization of the debate as "morally legitimate power"
vs. "socially organized power" retains the crucial concept of power as a common denominator for these
rival "real" definitions. I d. at 8 I. Indeed, their natural law definitions include the following definition
of the nature of a law: "Rule X is a law (is legally valid) if, and only if, there is a moral right to enforce
X." Jd. at 82 (emphasis supplied).
!59. Fuller has demonstrated, in effect, that this second sufficiency condition satisfies the two
criteria developed in the first part of this paper. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20, 87-95. Of
course, such an "enterprise" may include recourse to various "secondary" rules, principles, policies,
and perhaps more. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 19, Chs. 2-4. Though there may be other sufficient conditions, it would appear likely that most of the theorists considered in the foregoing pages
would be satisfied with these two, assuming they were to take the overlapping-sufficiency-condition
approach at all. In addition to the discussion in Part U of the text, see the compilation of other philosophers who have shown similar inclinations, though usually in the form of conjunctive necessity conditions rather than disjunctive sufficiency conditions, in Oberdiek, supra note 23, at 71-73. One
conspicuous exception is Raz, who points to three features: normativity, coerciveness, and institutionalization. J. RAz, supra note 3. However, institutionalization is a complex attribute the normative relevance of which is not at all obvious; it seems to be more appropriately considered as a contingent
feature which legal systems, and other social phenomena, may have in varying degrees. See supra note
5 I. In any event, most "institutions" will have component features which satisfy the sufficiency conditions given here for the existence of law.
160. See supra text accompanying note 88. Compare Jerome Hall's use of the term "law-asaction", supra note 2, at !50 et seq. See also A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978). This
characterization of the scope of inquiry appears neutral as between a focus upon 'laws' and one upon
'legal system', but Raz is probably correct (at least in many cases and at the level of theory construction) in arguing that the concept of a law is best approached through an understanding of the concept
of a legal system. J. R.Az, supra note 3, at 2 (I 980). But there are some analytical puzzles arising from
the potential clash between a systemic focus, on the one hand, and the methodological individualism
possibly latent in an active, purposive conception of law, on the other. See supra note I 10.
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Under such a view of the matter, it is accurate to say, for examle that coercion is an essential concept in the understanding of
fa\~.162 Further, one may characterize the satisfaction of both sufficiency conditions as generating a category of paradigmatic, though not
necessarily optimal, legal phenomena: viz., "law as the intersection of
coercion and the use of rules." 163 Put less abstractly, the practical
concerns which constitute the reasons for the study of law are the
most pressing just when the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to
the governance of rules involves or encounters the employment of coercion.164 And with such a characterization, it would also make sense
to say that coercion is a (logically) necessary feature of (paradigmatic
cases of) law - a proposition quite distinct from, but possibly confused with, the claim that law is in some definitional way required to
employ coercion or that an instance of legal phenomena cannot be
conceived which does not involve the employment of coercion. While
a legal "system" may have components which fall within the non-paradigmatic categories, it is within these paradigmatic contexts that the
important deci.sion-making has occurred in the past, occurs today, and
will occur for the foreseeable future. 165 To that extent, at least, the
views of the classical legal theorists, who emphasized the role of coercion, are vindicated. 166
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162. Oberdiek criticizes (supposedly) similar claims made by Aquinas and Kant. Oberdiek, supra
note 23, at 72.
163. One finds partial confirmation of this notion in anthropological and sociological definitions,
such as Weber's definition of law: "An order will be called law if it is externally guaranteed by the
probability that coercion (physical or psychological), to bring about conformity or to avenge violation,
will be applied by a staff of people holding themselves specially ready for that purpose." M. WEBER,
LAW AND ECONOMY IN SOCIETY 5 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
164. Notice that the overlap, or intersection, concerns not only the governance through rules
backed by coercion, but also the governance of coercion by rules. The former points, for example, to
Fuller's (external) morality of duty (as to law), the latter to his (internal) morality of aspiration (as to
law). See supra note 118.
165. Compare Ronald Dworkin's comment about uses of the term "law" which make the positivists' claims true "by stipulation":

But I [am] concerned with what I [take] to be an argument about the concept of law now in
general employment, which is, I take it, the concept of the standards that provide for the
rights and duties that a government has a duty to recognize and enforce, at least in principle, through the familiar institutions of courts and police.
R.

DWORKIN, supra

note 19, at 47.

166. See supra note 2. It is worth pointing out that identifying a certain social system, process,

rule, etc. as coercive does not necessarily mean that the social phenomenon in question is by and large
repressive. Oberdiek has argued, for example, that to see legal systems as necessarily coercive is to miss
the point that such systems can have a profoundly liberating effect. Oberdiek, supra note 23, at 92. But
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It is manifestly sensible to take such an overlapping sufficiency

approach, particularly when the issue is simply whether or not a given
social phenomenon is properly within the scope of our legal inquiry,
the scope which identifies the foci of our inquiry. The early positivists,
we have seen, focused upon what we have called "paradigmatic" cases
of law, while the modem positivists and natural lawyers tend to add
an emphasis upon the non-coercive relatives of the paradigmatic cases.
The present argument is that there is no good reason not to extend this
consideration to the more purely coercive cousins. The extension provides a nice symmetry to the modem arguments, preserving the paradigmatic category as that into which the ordinary language sense of
'law' falls. It reminds us of the seriousness of the Janus-faced quality
of law with which positivists and natural lawyers alike have struggled.167 Perhaps most importantly, it encourages us to consider the
possibility that a developed theory - prescriptive or descriptive in
character- may (or may not!) be significantly different if it addresses
the paradigmatic category than if it addresses either non-paradigmatic
category defined by the satisfaction of one, but not the other, sufficient
condition.
As a final comment, one may be concerned that in this scheme
there is an analytical priority of "ought" over "is" which may, if extended, lead to distortions of an "objective" picture of things. Certainly, the present proposal entails the acceptance of a certain kind of
primacy of practical deliberations, particularly those of the official decision-maker, the person facing the legal system's commands, and the
social critic. And there are precedents of policy-oriented theorists
who allow a particular normative theory to structure, perhaps excessively, their descriptive theory. The main example that comes to mind
is Bentham, who has been criticized for allowing his utilitarian reformism to lead him to mischaracterizing, for example, what it means
to have a legal right. 168 However, before one can say what is or what
ought to be in certain kinds of relations between people, one must
often get a better picture of what the common subject matter of these
issues is. In any event, the limited dimensions of the proposal made
here suggest a demurrer to this challenge until such time as more controversial components of a normative theory are introduced.
It seems unlikely that recognition of the centrality of coercion, its
this confuses "coercive" with "repressive" or "oppressive"; there is nothing incoherent or even implausible about a coercive system which has an overall liberating effect. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, supra note
145. CJ. Dewey, Force and Caercio11, 26 lNT'L J. ETHICS 359 (1916).
!67. Cf. H.L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 113.
168. See David Lyons's useful discussion of Hart's criticism of Bentham along these lines. Lyons,
supra note I, at 727-32.
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justification, and th~ justifica~ion o~ responses thereto, ~~mmits one in
advance to any particular social philosophy or theory or JUstice, except
insofar as it commits one to choosing among those theories which take
the matter of coercion very seriously. H is to be hoped that legal theory will benefit by the constant reminder that the practical purposes to
which law is put, and thus as to which even descriptive legal theory is
ultimately relevant, must satisfy the normative restraints which a just
society would place upon the use of coercion.

